OFFSEC · Offensive Security

Twelve Certificates and Three Hijacked Registries: Where Web Trust Actually Sits

Attackers took control of the operators of three country-code domain registries and used that DNS control to obtain valid HTTPS certificates for Google and YouTube names. No certificate authority did anything wrong, and that is the problem.

What Google disclosed

On 6 October the Chrome Secure Web and Networking Team published an account of three registry hijacks. Attackers compromised the third-party operators of the country-code top-level domains .gh, .sl and .as, which put any domain under those endings at risk; they modified authoritative DNS records and obtained unauthorised HTTPS certificates for several Google domains and for domains belonging to other organisations [1]. Google says it learned of the hijacks the week before publishing, and that the incidents “did not involve a compromise of Google’s systems” [1].

Google gave no certificate count, named no issuing authority and named no affected domain [1][3][4]. The public record fills that in. Certificate Transparency data, as reported by The Hacker News, shows at least twelve certificates issued across seven names, among them google.com.gh, youtube.com.gh, google.sl, google.com.sl, youtube.sl, google.as and youtube.as. Eleven came from Let’s Encrypt and one from ZeroSSL, all domain-validated, logged on 22 September for .gh, 25 September for .sl and 27 September for .as [2].

Revocation lagged. Three certificates were revoked on 26 September and the remaining nine on 1 October, which puts the gap between logging and revocation between roughly a day and a half and nearly a week [2]. Google also said Certificate Transparency data pointed to other affected organisations, described only as leading global brands and widely used services, and did not name them [1].

Nobody misbehaved

The most important sentence in the disclosure is the one absolving the certificate authorities, and it is almost certainly correct [1]. A compliant authority must check for a CAA record before issuing and must not issue where the record restricts it [5], and it must establish that the applicant controls the domain. Whoever holds the authoritative zone can satisfy that check. There is no defect to patch here, because the system worked exactly as specified against an applicant who had become, for validation purposes, the domain’s controller.

That places the failure a layer below the certificate system, in registry operations. Country-code registries are delegated to managers recorded in the public root database, and those managers are independent organisations rather than parties to the contractual regime that governs generic top-level domains [10]. The security of every certificate for every name under a country-code domain therefore inherits the operational security of whoever runs that registry. Google did not name the three operators, and this article does not either.

The reuse window is the exposure window

The detail that converts a short incident into a long problem is validation reuse. A certificate authority may reuse a completed domain control check for a period rather than revalidating on every request. One authority’s published schedule shows the shape of it: up to 397 days historically, 199 days from 24 February 2026, 99 days in early 2027 and 9 days in early 2029, tracking CA/Browser Forum limits of 200 days, then 100 days from March 2027 and 10 days after March 2029 [7]. Let’s Encrypt reuses checks for 30 days and has said it intends to cut that to seven hours by 2028 [2].

Google names the consequence directly: an attacker who passed a domain check while holding the hijacked zone can request further certificates after the hijack has ended [1][2]. The window of risk is not the duration of the registry compromise. It is the duration of the compromise plus the longest reuse period any authority applied during it, and the owner cannot see which authorities hold a cached pass.

What Chrome did, and what it cannot do

Chrome blocked the certificates for Google properties using CRLSets, worked with the issuing authorities to revoke them, and used Certificate Transparency to find certificates issued for other organisations, blocking those and contacting the owners where it could [1]. CRLSets are described by the project as “the primary means by which Chrome quickly blocks certificates in emergency situations”, built from revocation lists disclosed to the certificate authority database plus intermediates discovered through Certificate Transparency, refreshed at most once every few hours, and carrying only a subset of what those lists contain [9]. Chrome generally does not perform online revocation checks at all [9].

Google is candid about the limits. “Chrome users do not need to take any action to be protected”, but it also says “we cannot guarantee that our analysis identified every affected domain”, and browser-side blocking does nothing for users of other browsers, for non-browser clients, or for anything that pins trust differently [1][2][3]. A revoked certificate that a client never checks is still a working certificate against that client.

The controls that belong to you

Two measures sit with the domain owner rather than with the browser. The first is Certificate Transparency monitoring. The logs are append-only, publicly verifiable and tamper-evident, recording which authority issued what, when, and for which names, which lets an owner see every certificate issued for its domains and spot issuance it did not request [8]. Google’s own recommendation is to monitor the entire portfolio, including parked and regional country-code names, and for holders of .gh, .sl or .as names to review recent entries now [1].

The second is CAA. RFC 8659 lets a holder name the authorities permitted to issue, and obliges a compliant authority to check before issuing [5]. RFC 8657 narrows that further, with an accounturi parameter that limits authorisation to a specific account at an authority and a validationmethods parameter that limits which validation methods may be used [6]. Google recommends restrictive CAA records with account binding [1]. The honest limit is that CAA lives in DNS: an attacker holding the zone can remove or rewrite it, so CAA protects the period after control is recovered rather than the period during the hijack [2]. As of 7 October all seven affected names carried strict CAA records naming only Google’s own authority [2].

There is also a procedural lever worth knowing. A domain owner who finds unauthorised issuance can file a certificate problem report with the issuing authority, which is then required to investigate and provide initial findings within 24 hours [2].

What to do

  • Inventory every domain your organisation holds, including defensive registrations and country-code names nobody has looked at in years, and put all of them under Certificate Transparency monitoring [1][8].
  • Publish restrictive CAA records with account binding where your authority supports it, and understand that this protects you after you regain DNS control, not during a hijack [1][5][6].
  • Ask your registrar and registry what account protections exist on your names: registry lock, multi-party change approval, and who at the registry can alter delegation [1].
  • Treat the validation-reuse period as part of your exposure calculation and ask each authority you use how long it caches a passed check [2][7].
  • Do not treat browser blocking as remediation. It is a stopgap for one client family, and the issuing authority’s revocation is what protects everyone else [1][9].
  • If you find unauthorised issuance, file a certificate problem report and hold the authority to its 24-hour initial-findings obligation [2].

The general lesson is about inherited trust. An organisation can run its own name servers properly, pin its certificates, and still have valid certificates minted for its brand because a registry operator on another continent lost control of a zone. Encryption was never a guarantee that a connection reached the right party; it is a guarantee that it reached whoever holds a certificate the client accepts. The practical response is unglamorous: know every name you own, watch the logs that record issuance against them, and treat the organisations that run your top-level domains as part of your supply chain, because they are.

Sources

Every R3KONX article cites its primary material. 10 sources, in order of first citation. Links open the original publication.

  1. Chrome's Response to Recent ccTLD Registry Hijacks Google, Chrome Secure Web and Networking Team · 2026-10-06
  2. Attackers Hijack .gh, .sl, and .as Registries to Obtain Certificates for Google Domains The Hacker News · 2026-10-07
  3. Hackers hijack three country-code domain registries, obtain HTTPS certificates for Google domains Help Net Security · 2026-10-07
  4. Hackers Hijack .gh, .sl and .as Registry to Obtain Unauthorized HTTPS Certificates Cryptika · 2026-10-07
  5. RFC 8659: DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record IETF · 2019-11
  6. RFC 8657: Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Record Extensions for Account URI and ACME Method Binding IETF · 2019-11
  7. Domain validation reuse changes in 2026 DigiCert Knowledge Base · 2026-10-08
  8. Certificate Transparency Certificate Transparency project · 2026-10-08
  9. CRLSets The Chromium Projects · 2026-10-08
  10. Root Zone Database: delegation record for .gh IANA · 2026-10-08

Researched and written by the R3KONX analysis desk from the cited primary material. Google's disclosure names neither the issuing certificate authorities, the affected domains, nor the registry operators; the certificate count, issuers and dates are taken from Certificate Transparency data as reported by The Hacker News and are attributed as such. The registry operators are not named here, because the disclosing party did not name them. Validation-reuse periods are quoted from a certificate authority's published schedule, the CA/Browser Forum documents themselves having returned no usable text from this desk. No exploitation detail is reproduced. Corrections to event@r3konx.asia.

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