Russia’s Kometa anti-jam modules expose the limits of GNSS jamming as a defence

The finding

Russian strike weapons are now fitted with controlled reception pattern antennas (CRPAs) at a volume that changes the economics of GNSS jamming. Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence (HUR) says Russian defence manufacturers have ordered Kometa anti-jam navigation modules in 2026 that “significantly exceed 100,000 units” across configurations ^[1]. It reports 16-element arrays in use at scale, 20-element arrays entering serial production, and 32-element antennas made in China and at Alabuga in service ^[1]. Reporting from Kyiv on 2 November says the larger arrays are now being met over the capital ^[3].

The module is not exotic. HUR lists 37 foreign electronic components in it, from close to 20 manufacturers in the US, China, Switzerland, Japan and Taiwan, and names Altera Cyclone FPGAs and Analog Devices converters and RF integrated circuits as critical ^[1]. Militarnyi, citing the same HUR data, gives the breakdown as 28 US, three Japanese, three Chinese, two Swiss and one Taiwanese component ^[6]. The Defense Post reports identical figures ^[7]. HUR’s English release does not itself give that per-country split, so the breakdown rests on those reports.

What the data says

A CRPA is a multi-element antenna that weights and sums its element outputs to place nulls toward interference and gain toward satellites ^[8]. Each additional jammer nulled costs sky coverage, and element count and layout drive performance ^[8]. Element count is the variable Russia is scaling. HUR states that Kometa’s resistance depends on the number and arrangement of patch elements and on the signal-separation algorithm in the FPGA ^[1].

The operational effect is reported in numbers by the people defending against it. Serhii Beskrestnov, an EW adviser to Ukraine’s president, wrote in October that a Shahed with the older 16-element antenna needed about 16 EW sources around it, and the 32-element version needs roughly twice as many ^[4]. He described the race as favouring the side adding elements, because an antenna element is easier to add than an EW site ^[3][4]. These are Ukrainian assessments. Neither report publishes measurement data, and no Russian response is quoted ^[3].

The physical evidence has accumulated in stages. In July a Ukrainian unit commander described a captured 32-element antenna as two 16-element arrays covering different navigation bands ^[3][5]. At that point Militarnyi reported that a 32-element model shown by the Chinese manufacturer Harxon in May had not been detected on Russian weapons ^[5]. In October, The Insider, as reported by Militarnyi, found a 32-element CRPA in a downed Geran-4 with an “ALB” casing mark and a Harxon-like design, and judged local assembly at Alabuga likely rather than confirmed ^[9]. HUR now presents Chinese- and Alabuga-made 32-element units as confirmed ^[1]. The Alabuga attribution should be read as HUR’s assessment.

The supply chain runs through civilian catalogues. A Nordsint investigation with The Insider, published in May, reported that Harxon and an intermediary, NavX, supplied most of the navigation antennas found in Geran debris, and that captured units carried labels describing them as agricultural machinery navigation antennas ^[10]. Harxon denied the claims, and the work is a media investigation rather than an official finding ^[10]. HUR’s portal entry for the Kometa-M8 variant, found in a guided-munition kit, lists two Linear Technology (Analog Devices) DC/DC converters and a u-blox MAX-M10S GNSS module ^[2]. The receiver core can be a mass-market part.

The wider drone picture is consistent. A cross-border investigation coordinated by the Kyiv Independent and OCCRP found 294 foreign parts in one Alabuga-made Geran-2 and 112 in a Kupol-made one, including parts manufactured in 2024 and 2025 ^[11]. It reported routing mainly through China and Hong Kong, with Turkey, the UAE, Kyrgyzstan, Thailand and India among transit points ^[11].

What it means

Three conclusions follow. First, area GNSS jamming is a depreciating defence against weapons carrying modern CRPAs. If the reported doubling holds, each step up in element count raises the number of emitters a defender needs ^[4]. The defender pays in sites, power and people. The attacker pays in antenna elements and an FPGA.

Second, CRPA capability has moved from bespoke military programmes into commercial supply. GPS World’s technical primer notes that CRPA implementation detail is constrained by export controls ^[8]. Yet the parts HUR identifies are catalogue FPGAs, data converters, power modules and GNSS receivers ^[1][2], and journalists have tied a commercial antenna vendor to the arrays ^[10]. The practical control point is less the antenna design than the parts, the intermediaries and the end user.

Third, the people who can act on this are not only in uniform. The Common High Priority List, agreed by the US, the EU, the UK and Japan, places integrated circuits (HS 8542) in Tier 1, radio navigational aid apparatus (HS 8526.91) in Tier 2 and aerials (HS 8529.10) in Tier 3.A ^[12][13]. BIS warns that Russia uses third-party intermediaries and transshipment points, and that parties can face liability even when they act inadvertently ^[12]. Several of the named source countries and transit points are in Asia ^[1][11].

What to do

• EW and air-defence planners: stop treating GNSS denial as a standalone layer against modern strike UAS and missiles. Plan for a growing share of threats that continue through jamming, and assess layer capacity against the element counts now reported ^[1][4].
• Intelligence and technical-exploitation teams: record element count, band split, casing marks and receiver module for every recovered navigation unit. HUR’s portal format, with component markings and named contract manufacturers, is a usable template ^[2]. Trend findings against HUR’s reported production stages ^[1].
• Component makers and distributors, including those in Japan, Taiwan, China and South-East Asian distribution hubs: screen orders for FPGAs, data converters, RF ICs and GNSS modules against the CHPL HS codes, and verify end users and intermediaries rather than the declared application ^[12][13]. Labelling navigation antennas as agricultural equipment has been reported in this supply chain ^[10].
• GNSS antenna and module vendors: review whether end-use controls on multi-element and anti-jam products survive resale through channel partners ^[10][11].
• Compliance teams: check the current CHPL version. Both BIS and the European Commission state that the list is updated as new findings from recovered Russian weapons arrive ^[12][13].
• Operators who depend on jamming-based protection of sites: assume adversary platforms may carry CRPAs, and evaluate any protective measure against multi-element receivers, not only single-antenna ones ^[8].

Domain close

The Kometa disclosures put numbers on a familiar EW contest. Ukrainian intelligence puts Russian orders above 100,000 modules this year, and reported element counts have doubled ^[1][4]. The critical parts are largely Western catalogue items reaching Russia through intermediaries ^[1][6][11]. Jamming-based defence and export controls are therefore under pressure from the same supply chain. Practitioners should track element counts on recovered hardware and apply end-use checks to the parts that go into it.