PolyShell reaches KEV 224 days after the first public warning, and patching does not evict the intruder
CISA has listed the Adobe Commerce and Magento upload flaw as exploited. Sansec's latest research shows the operator behind one long-running loader campaign is still rewriting stores it already holds, including one with no missing core patches.
The most important fact about PolyShell is not that it is now on the US Known Exploited Vulnerabilities list. It is that the operator exploiting it no longer needs it. Sansec reported on 24 October that a single group has injected script loaders into 953 Magento-based stores since July 2025, and that its October changes used no new vulnerability because most of those stores were already compromised [1]. CISA added the flaw, CVE-2026-48356, to the KEV catalogue on 27 October with a federal remediation deadline of 10 November 2026 [2][3]. For many merchants, the patch now closes a door the intruder walked through months ago.
What the data says
CVE-2026-48356 is an unrestricted upload of a file with a dangerous type in Adobe Commerce, Adobe Commerce B2B, Magento Open Source and Adobe Commerce Events [4]. Adobe fixed it in bulletin APSB26-73, published 14 July 2026 and last updated 11 August [4]. The bulletin rates it critical at CVSS 9.6 and still states that Adobe is not aware of any exploits in the wild [4]. Reports quoting the CVE record and NVD give 9.3; the two scores differ only in the availability impact [11]. Sansec, which named the flaw, describes an unauthenticated upload through the storefront REST API in which a file passes an image-header check while carrying executable content [5]. Adobe’s scoring requires user interaction; Sansec’s description does not [11][12]. The two accounts have not been reconciled.
The timeline is the substance of the story. Sansec published its warning on 17 March 2026 and said no production fix existed [5]. It recorded mass exploitation from 19 March [7]. By 24 March, Sansec reported malicious uploads on 56.7% of the stores in its dataset, rising to 82% by 14 April [5]; BleepingComputer reported the March figure as attacks on 56.7% of all vulnerable stores [7]. On 30 March Sansec counted 471 stores compromised within one hour, with the chain from upload to script injection fully automated [6]. Akamai shipped a web application firewall rule on 27 March [8].
The fix existed earlier than production merchants could use it. Akamai and Sansec place it in the 2.4.9 pre-release under APSB25-94 in October 2025 [8][5]. BleepingComputer reported Adobe’s fix in 2.4.9-beta1 on 10 March 2026 [7]. The sources differ on which pre-release first carried it. Sansec says the 2.4.9 general release of 12 May contained the fix, but older lines received nothing until the July backports [5]. Adobe’s own bulletin lists plain 2.4.9 as affected and 2.4.9-2026-jul as fixed [4]. Ostorlab calculates 119 days from public warning to backport and 224 days from warning to KEV listing [10].
The backports also carry friction. Adobe ships them as isolated patch files, not Composer packages, and each applies only to the latest security patch level of its line [9]. A store on an older patch level must first upgrade, then patch [9]. Magento Open Source isolated patches are available only for 2.4.6 and later [9].
Sansec’s October research links the vulnerability to a long-running loader campaign. Sansec puts the operator’s footprint at 953 stores since July 2025. The March PolyShell wave accounts for 471 of them, loaded in one hour after webshell uploads [1][6]. Of 169 Magento 2 installs carrying the loader and missing at least one core patch, 102 also had files uploaded through PolyShell or SessionReaper (CVE-2025-54236) [1]. Ostorlab reads the 471 as the share of the campaign entered through PolyShell [10]; Sansec gives no PolyShell-only total. A new loader domain registered on 6 October appeared on 83 stores by 24 October; 60 of those had already run an earlier loader from the same operator [1]. The loader persists a payload in the visitor’s browser storage, so it can run again even when the delivery domain is blocked [1]. From 23 October the operator added browser fingerprinting that returns nothing to automated browsers [1]. Sansec has not captured the final payload, so the campaign’s objective is unconfirmed [1][2]. Earlier PolyShell waves delivered a payment card skimmer, including on the online store of a large car maker, according to Sansec as reported by BleepingComputer [7].
What it means
PolyShell repeats the SessionReaper pattern of 2025. Adobe patched that flaw on 9 September 2025; Sansec found only 38% of stores patched by 23 October, the day after mass attacks began, and estimated 16 to 18% of stores had backdoors by 26 October [13]. Magento estates patch slowly, and attackers have learned to harvest the backlog.
The vendor exploitation statement is not a reliable signal here. Adobe’s bulletin carried ‘not aware of any exploits’ while one researcher had already published months of mass-exploitation telemetry [4][5]. Defenders who triage on vendor exploitation flags would have deprioritised a flaw that KEV now lists.
Configuration mattered more than version for months. Whether an uploaded file executes depends on the web server [5]. Magento’s sample nginx configuration denies all access to the custom options upload path and passes only a fixed list of entry scripts to PHP [14]. Stores that kept those defaults limited the damage. Hosting providers frequently use custom configurations, so the protection cannot be assumed [10]. A blocked file still sits on disk and becomes dangerous if the configuration later changes [5].
The most uncomfortable finding is that patched stores are not clean stores. Sansec found the October loader on a store running 2.4.7-p10, an hour after a clean scan; it had earlier found a rogue administrator account and a backdoor on the same host [1]. Removing the injected script does not remove the attacker’s database access [1].
What to do
- Inventory every Adobe Commerce and Magento instance, including staging and agency-hosted sites, and confirm the running version on each node rather than in the build image [10][12].
- Apply APSB26-73: move to the 2026-jul release for the line, or reach the latest patch level and apply the isolated patch; update Adobe Commerce Events to 1.21.0 where used [4][9].
- Treat 2.4.9 as affected unless the 2026-jul build is installed, following Adobe’s list rather than the earlier general release [4][11].
- Confirm the web server denies access to the custom options upload directory and that rule ordering prevents files there from reaching PHP; verify on managed hosting, where custom configurations are common [5][14].
- Run a compromise assessment regardless of patch state: inspect the upload directory for unexpected files, review CMS blocks and pages for injected script loaders, and audit administrator accounts [1][11].
- If anything is found, rotate database, administrator and API integration credentials after clean-up [1][11].
- Close SessionReaper (APSB25-88) at the same time, since the same operator has used both entry points [1][12].
- Do not rely on a cloud WAF until the provider confirms a matching rule; Sansec reported that not all providers published one [5][10].
The offensive security view
PolyShell shows how an attacker converts a disclosure window into durable access. The exploit chain was automated within days of public research [6]. The operator then moved from exploitation to tenure, maintaining loaders on stores it already held and rotating loader domains [1]. KEV arrived after that transition. For defenders, the useful question is no longer whether a store is patched but whether it was exposed between March and July. Any store that was should be assessed as compromised until shown otherwise. This assessment rests largely on one vendor’s telemetry, and independent confirmation from other researchers would strengthen it.
Sources
Every R3KONX article cites its primary material. 14 sources, in order of first citation. Links open the original publication.
- Magento CMS block loader campaign (deepveindrilling) Sansec · 2026-10-24
- Adobe Commerce PolyShell Attacks Breach Hundreds of Stores as Brotli Exploit Traffic Emerges The Hacker News · 2026-10-28
- Exploited in October: The Vulnerabilities CISA Says Attackers Are Using Now Cybersecurity ASEAN · 2026-10-27
- Security update available for Adobe Commerce | APSB26-73 Adobe · 2026-07-14
- PolyShell: unauthenticated file upload in Magento REST API Sansec · 2026-03-17
- PolyShell mass attack wave Sansec · 2026-03-30
- PolyShell attacks target 56 percent of all vulnerable Magento stores BleepingComputer · 2026-03-25
- Magento PolyShell: the latest Magento threat (APSB25-94) Akamai · 2026-03-27
- KA-37421: Isolated patches for APSB26-73 Adobe Experience League · 2026-08-20
- Magento and Adobe Commerce PolyShell RCE Exploited in the Wild (CVE-2026-48356) Ostorlab · 2026-10-28
- Adobe Commerce and Magento CVE-2026-48356 (PolyShell) Added to CISA KEV: Apply APSB26-73 and Check for Planted Files Rescana · 2026-10-28
- Adobe Commerce and Magento CVE-2026-48356 Is on KEV: What to Patch and Check Safeguard · 2026-10-28
- SessionReaper: critical Magento and Adobe Commerce vulnerability Sansec · 2025-09-08
- nginx.conf.sample (magento2, 2.4-develop) Magento Open Source on GitHub · accessed 2026-10-28
Researched and written by the R3KONX analysis desk from the cited primary material. Exploitation and store-count figures come almost entirely from one vendor, Sansec, and have not been independently replicated. The CISA alert, the KEV catalogue entry, the NVD record, the CVE.org record and Adobe's APSB25-94 bulletin could not be retrieved; KEV dates and the 9.3 CVSS score are taken from reports that quote them. Adobe and Sansec give different fixed versions for the 2.4.9 line and differ on whether user interaction is required; both positions are reported. Corrections to event@r3konx.asia.
