SilentAir: signalling interception from inside Asian mobile operators, with SMS codes as the target
Enea reports a previously unknown state-level actor that sends SS7 and Diameter commands from inside compromised operators in at least six Asian countries. Its main targets are Taiwanese subscribers. The same report documents a new GTPDoor variant tied to LIMINAL PANDA. For everyone outside the operators, the practical lesson is to stop relying on SMS for authentication.
On 11 November 2026, the Swedish telecom security vendor Enea published research on an actor it calls SilentAir. The actor sends SS7 and Diameter signalling commands from network elements inside mobile operators, not from leased or rented access [1]. Enea researchers assess with high confidence that SilentAir is a new state-level actor and not a commercial surveillance company [1][2][3]. They assess with low confidence that its activity aligns with China-nexus operations [1][4][5]. Its main targets are subscribers in Taiwan, including political and government VIPs [1][2][6].
The same report covers a second actor, LIMINAL PANDA, and a new version of the GTPDoor backdoor. Enea does not directly link SilentAir to LIMINAL PANDA. It describes a link as possible but unconfirmed [1][4].
What Enea observed
Enea found suspicious SS7 and Diameter elements associated with SilentAir in at least six Asian countries. It suspects there are more [1][2][3]. No source names the countries or operators. Attacks reached subscribers in about a dozen further countries and territories [1][3][4]. Some reports add East Africa, Central Asia, the Middle East and Europe [2][6]. Enea has tracked the activity since early 2025 and found traces from earlier still [1][2]. Activity comes in bursts separated by months of quiet. A single burst can target one subscriber or several thousand over a month [1][4][5].
The mix of commands distinguishes SilentAir from commercial surveillance operators. According to Enea, interception makes up 18.30% of its activity, against 2.07% for a typical surveillance company. Location tracking is 0.22%, against 30.90% [1][4][8]. SC Media rounds the interception share to 18% [7]. SilentAir redirects a subscriber’s SMS and voice using update-location procedures in SS7 or Diameter [1][2]. MITRE ATT&CK for Mobile catalogues this class as T1449, now shown as deprecated [14]. For some targets, two-factor authentication codes arrived immediately after interception began. Enea reads that as attempts to access the targets’ other accounts. No account takeover is confirmed [1][2][5].
Most of the activity, 74.27%, is silent SMS sent at very large scale [1][4]. Night-time bursts, peaking around midnight, mainly hit Taiwanese subscribers. Enea believes the daytime traffic to other networks tests whether earlier redirections worked [1].
The most significant finding is location. Enea confirmed that a node inside an operator both sent and received attack commands. That means the operator’s own network was compromised [1][2]. The actor uses global titles that resemble legitimate ones and answers transactions it did not start. Enea could not obtain the binary for analysis [1].
The working pattern underpins the low-confidence China assessment. Activity follows a UTC+8 working day starting around 09:00, essentially stops at weekends, and pauses around Chinese holidays [1][2]. That is circumstantial evidence. Enea treats it as such.
LIMINAL PANDA and GTPDoor v3
CrowdStrike researchers named LIMINAL PANDA in 2024. They assess with low confidence that it aligns with China-nexus operations, and with high confidence that it runs targeted intrusions for intelligence collection. It has targeted telecoms since at least 2020 [9]. Singapore’s IMDA issued an advisory on the group citing that research [10]. According to Enea, Brandefense assesses with moderate confidence that parts of the group work for a regional bureau of China’s Ministry of State Security [1][4]. Unit 42 says its cluster CL-STA-0969, active against telecoms in 2024, heavily overlaps LIMINAL PANDA [12][13].
Attribution of GTPDoor differs. HaxRob, who first analysed the backdoor in February 2024, later linked it likely to UNC1945, also called LightBasin [11]. Enea and others associate it with LIMINAL PANDA [1][4]. Readers should hold both views.
From Q1 2026, Enea’s GTP firewall detected and blocked several hundred attempted covert command exchanges at customer operators [1][4][5]. Observed commands included exfiltration tunnels, lateral movement, starting SSH, and anti-forensic file deletion and timestomping [1][4]. Version 3 hides its commands in GTP-U user-plane traffic, which 5G also carries. It captures packets with libpcap, so it does not show in netstat or lsof [1][2][4]. Enea counts at least five to ten infected operators observed or strongly indicated. It estimates several dozen worldwide, concentrated in Asia, Africa and Latin America [1][3][4][5].
What is not established
The operators, countries and individual targets are not named. Nobody knows how many subscribers were actually intercepted, or whether any account was taken over [1][8]. SilentAir’s tooling has not been analysed. No government has attributed the activity. All SilentAir data comes from one vendor’s sensors, and that vendor sells signalling firewalls [1][8]. Enea says it worked with operators to remove the intruders and believes both groups are disrupted for now. It warns that the conditions that let them in remain [1][3].
What to do
- Operators: deploy GTP-C and GTP-U inspection integrated with SS7 and Diameter firewalls. Treat the whole IPX, including DNS and ICMP, as untrusted, and monitor internal control-plane signalling, not only the border [1][2].
- Operators: restrict the GTP-C port to systems that need it and drop malformed GTP-C. Hunt for raw sockets and for processes named like kernel threads whose parent is not kthreadd [11].
- Core network teams: put EDR on servers that are not internet-facing. Use key-based SSH and log server-to-server sessions. Audit firewall rules for unknown inbound entries, and monitor the integrity of system binaries [9][10].
- Operators that outsource managed core operations: review that access. Enea flags outsourcing as a risk in its own right [1].
- Enterprises and high-risk individuals: remove SMS as an MFA factor and disable SMS fallback. Move to FIDO security keys or passkeys, set a carrier account PIN, and use end-to-end encrypted messaging [8][15].
For Malaysia and the wider region, the relevant fact is where the activity was seen. Southeast Asian SMS centres carried the silent-SMS traffic [1]. The compromised operators are Asian. Because the interception happens inside operators, an organisation’s own security controls never see it. Banks, government agencies and event platforms in the region that still send one-time codes by SMS should plan to replace them.
Sources
Every R3KONX article cites its primary material. 15 sources, in order of first citation. Links open the original publication.
- The Enemy Within: Tracking LIMINAL PANDA and SilentAir through mobile networks Enea · 2026-11-11
- SilentAir hijacks Asian telecom networks to intercept calls and SMS The Hacker News · 2026-11-13
- Hacked Asian Telcos Used to Intercept Taiwanese Calls and Texts Infosecurity Magazine · 2026-11-12
- SilentAir and LIMINAL PANDA Target Telecom Networks to Spy on Subscribers Security Affairs · 2026-11-16
- SilentAir and LIMINAL PANDA Hijack Telecom Networks to Spy on Calls Daily Security Review · 2026-11-16
- Enea: state-backed hacking group infiltrated telecom networks in six Asian countries DigitalToday · 2026-11-14
- State-level actor SilentAir targets mobile subscribers in Taiwan SC Media · 2026-11-13
- SilentAir hackers hijack Asian telecom operators' SMS 2FA Pasquale Pillitteri · 2026-11
- LIMINAL PANDA: telecom sector threats CrowdStrike · 2024-11-19
- LIMINAL PANDA leverage telecom-specific protocols for espionage operations Infocomm Media Development Authority, Singapore · 2024
- GTPDOOR: a novel backdoor tailored for covert access over the roaming exchange HaxRob · 2025-06-08
- Infiltration of global telecom networks (CL-STA-0969) Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 · 2025-09-04
- Nation-state group CL-STA-0969 targeted Southeast Asian telecoms in 2024 Security Affairs · 2025-08-04
- T1449: Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS MITRE ATT&CK · 2026-11
- Mobile Communications Best Practice Guidance CISA · 2024-12-18
Researched and written by the R3KONX Analysis Desk from the cited primary material. All SilentAir observations come from a single vendor's customer sensors and have not been independently confirmed; attributions are the named researchers' assessments. Corrections: event@r3konx.asia.
