CYOPS · Cyber Operations

Two years of MATCHBOIL changes, one unchanged access path

ESET tracked a UAC-0099 downloader across samples compiled between April 2024 and April 2026. Obfuscation, persistence, naming, decoys and environment checks all changed. The step that gets it onto the machine did not.

What was published

On 8 October ESET published an analysis by Fernando Tavella of MATCHBOIL, a custom C# downloader used by the group CERT-UA tracks as UAC-0099 [1]. The study covers samples compiled between April 2024 and April 2026. ESET assesses with medium confidence, on the basis of targeting, that the group is aligned with Russian interests, and describes it as possibly acting as an initial access broker for Sandworm, a separate Russia-aligned group [1][3]. Recorded Future News reported the same assessment in the wording that the group is likely working in Russia’s interests [2]. The attribution is the researchers’ assessment and is reported here as such.

The victim set in ESET’s telemetry was entirely Ukrainian: several transport companies in July and August 2025, a manufacturing company in December 2025, and an energy-sector company in June 2026 [1][2][3]. Two samples uploaded to a public scanning service in February 2026 also came from Ukraine [1]. That victim profile is a shift. The group’s previously reported focus was Ukrainian government bodies, financial institutions and media [1][2].

What changed across two years

Nearly every implementation detail moved between the first and last samples.

  • Obfuscation. The 2024 samples hid class and method names using unprintable Unicode characters and encrypted strings with a combination of exclusive-or and bit shifts. By November and December 2025 the operators had moved to a commercial .NET obfuscator with control-flow obfuscation and code virtualisation [1][4].
  • Execution model. Early builds ran once and stopped. Late-2025 builds put the command-and-control logic on a two-minute timer, so a failed retrieval could be retried and a newer payload collected [1][4][5].
  • Persistence. A registry value plus a scheduled task in 2024, the registry run key alone in mid-2025, a scheduled task firing every seven minutes by late 2025, and a task named for an update check under a mail-client directory in the April 2026 variant [1][4].
  • Payload naming. The installed payload moved from a device-monitoring name in 2024, through an incongruous one in late 2025, to a mail-client name in 2026 [1][3].
  • Decoys. Late-2025 and 2026 builds require a specific command-line argument and otherwise display a working-looking utility: a daily planner in one case, a text-search tool in another. ESET notes the planner’s cover was weak, with a duplicated field label and a typographical error in the window title [1][4].
  • Environment checks. System uptime read from Windows event records, a check for an attached debugger, and in the April 2026 variant a test on how long ago the operating system was installed [1][4].
  • Packaging. The April 2026 build is the first delivered as a library rather than an executable, run by a separate custom loader. CERT-UA designates that version MATCHBOIL.V2 [1][4].

The payload installed in most cases is MATCHWOK, a C# backdoor ESET says is used exclusively by this group, with screenshot capture and PowerShell command execution [1][3]. An earlier CERT-UA-documented campaign paired the same downloader with a stealer, DRAGSTARE, which took browser credentials, cookies and files from the desktop [2][8].

What did not change

The access path. In every iteration the chain begins with a spearphishing email carrying a link, the link delivers an archive, and the archive contains a script that the recipient has to run by hand [1][5]. ESET’s description of the 2026 samples differs from its description of the 2024 samples in almost every respect except that one.

The infrastructure pattern is close to static as well. Command-and-control servers run on rented virtual private servers, with a content delivery network in front of the origin, and the operators’ certificates are issued by a free certificate authority and are not reused across domains [1][3][4]. The practical effect is that network-layer blocking of the hosting or the certificate issuer achieves nothing, because both are shared with legitimate traffic at scale.

The lure has a longer history than the malware. CERT-UA first documented the group in June 2023 [1][2]. In December 2023, Deep Instinct’s analysis of the group’s earlier LONEPAGE downloader described three chains: phishing with HTA attachments, self-extracting archives holding a shortcut disguised as a court-summons document, and archives exploiting CVE-2023-38831 in WinRAR, which was patched in August 2023 and found in use three days after the patch [10]. In August 2025, CERT-UA reported court-summons phishing sent through a Ukrainian webmail provider against state authorities, the Defence Forces and defence-industrial enterprises, delivering MATCHBOIL, MATCHWOK and DRAGSTARE [8][9]. In July 2026 the group shipped a copy of a widely used text editor together with a malicious plugin library, using the editor to load its own code, with CERT-UA naming two further components alongside MATCHBOIL.V2 and advising that archive and editor software be kept current [7].

What the published material does not establish

  • Scale. Neither ESET nor CERT-UA has disclosed how many organisations or individuals were compromised [2]. Three named victims across three sectors do not bound the campaign [5].
  • Deployment dates. Compilation timestamps show when a sample was built, not when it was used [4].
  • First documentation date. ESET and Recorded Future News both give August 2025 for CERT-UA’s first MATCHBOIL report [1][2]. One secondary account gives August 2025 in one place and April 2025 in another and should not be relied on for that date [6].
  • A Sandworm handoff. The initial access broker relationship is an assessment, not an observed transfer [1][3]. ESET’s APT activity report for October 2025 to March 2026, published on 28 May 2026, records Sandworm deploying wipers against Ukrainian government and private-sector targets and attributes a December 2025 destructive incident at a Polish energy company to the group with medium confidence [11]. That is the context the brokering assessment sits in. It is not evidence for it.

What to do

Detection built on the stable step survives the next revision. Detection built on the parts that change does not.

  • Hunt for unexpected script-interpreter execution from user-writable paths, particularly scripts that arrived inside archives fetched from links [4][5].
  • Alert on newly created scheduled tasks with short, regular intervals, and on repeated outbound HTTPS sessions from .NET binaries with no business history [4][5].
  • Expect benign-looking decoy interfaces and utility or mail-client naming. A window that renders cleanly is not evidence that a binary is legitimate [1][4].
  • Treat content-delivery-network-fronted infrastructure as uninformative for blocking, and pivot on behaviour instead [5].
  • Logistics, manufacturing and energy operators should read the 2025 to 2026 victim shift as scope rather than as a change of subject [1][2][3].
  • Keep archive utilities and editors patched and control plugin loading. This group has used both as execution surfaces, three years apart [7][10].

The cyber operations reading

Two years of development went into making this downloader harder to analyse: a commercial obfuscator, timers in place of one-shot execution, sandbox and debugger checks, credible decoy interfaces, and a library variant with its own loader. None of it went into the first step. The operation still needs a person to open an archive and run a script.

That tells a defender where the cost sits and where the leverage sits. Analysis resistance is expensive for the attacker and buys time against a sandbox. The delivery step is cheap for the attacker and remains the only point in the chain that has not been revised in two years. The toolchain will change again. Controls placed on script execution and on scheduled-task creation will still be in the right place when it does.

Sources

Every R3KONX article cites its primary material. 11 sources, in order of first citation. Links open the original publication.

  1. MATCHBOIL: New tricks, same old evil intentions ESET Research (WeLiveSecurity) · 2026-10-08
  2. Russian-aligned spies upgrade malware used in attacks on Ukrainian transport, energy firms The Record / Recorded Future News · 2026-10-08
  3. What is MATCHBOIL? The Russia-aligned malware that installs a spying backdoor Help Net Security · 2026-10-08
  4. MATCHBOIL Malware Adds Sandbox Checks, .NET Reactor Obfuscation and Persistent C2 GBHackers · 2026-10-09
  5. MATCHBOIL Malware Uses Cloudflare-Hidden C2 Servers to Deliver Backdoor Payloads Cyber Security News · 2026-10-08
  6. ESET: UAC-0099 MATCHBOIL Malware Evolves, Keeps Targeting Ukraine TechNadu · 2026-10
  7. Fake Notepad++ Plugin Delivers MATCHBOIL.V2 in UAC-0099 Attacks The Hacker News · 2026-07-24
  8. CERT-UA warns of UAC-0099 phishing attacks targeting Ukraine's defense sector Security Affairs · 2025-08-07
  9. Cybersecurity alert: UAC-0099 phishing attacks targeting Ukraine's defense sectors SC Media · 2025-08-07
  10. UAC-0099 Using WinRAR Exploit to Target Ukraine with LONEPAGE Malware The Hacker News · 2023-12-22
  11. ESET APT Activity Report Q4 2025-Q1 2026 ESET Research (WeLiveSecurity) · 2026-05-28

Researched and written by the R3KONX analysis desk from the cited primary material. Attribution of this activity to UAC-0099 and the assessed alignment with Russian interests are the cited researchers' assessments and not R3KONX findings; victim counts have not been published by either ESET or CERT-UA, and no indicators of compromise are reproduced here. Corrections to event@r3konx.asia.

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