Microsoft’s YAM Store takedown hits the hijacked cloud tenants behind Chinese-language phishing kits
A civil seizure order against YAM Store, CoGUI and Iron Man targets the supply side of a phishing economy that Microsoft links to more than a billion messages this year. The access layer was legitimate Microsoft 365 and Azure for Education tenants.

Microsoft’s latest civil takedown is aimed at the suppliers of a phishing economy, not at the people sending the lures. On 14 October Microsoft’s Digital Crimes Unit and Threat Intelligence team described YAM Store, an underground marketplace that resold access to compromised or fraudulently obtained cloud tenants, and three phishing kits sold through it: CoGUI, Haozi and Iron Man System [1][2]. The order behind the seizure was granted on 7 October by a federal judge in the Southern District of Florida, on a request by Microsoft and Health-ISAC [5]. The operationally important detail is the access layer. Phishing pages and payloads were hosted on hijacked Microsoft 365 and Azure for Education tenants that looked legitimate to both victims and filters [1][6].
What Microsoft describes
Microsoft tracks YAM Store as Storm-3119. It assesses with high confidence that Chinese-speaking actors, tracked as Storm-2990, developed the three kits [1]. CoGUI and Haozi were sold through YAM Store first. Iron Man System followed from June 2026, and The Record reports that criminals began shifting to it by mid-year [1][2].
Microsoft describes YAM Store as a five-stage pipeline [1]:
- Automated reconnaissance, run through Tor, to find and profile organisations with cloud tenants.
- Takeover through actor-controlled admin panels that use stolen application credentials to reset passwords silently and assign education licences.
- Abuse of compromised Global Administrator accounts to grant broad Graph and SharePoint permissions, then bulk hosting on SharePoint and OneDrive.
- A custom DNS platform to manage phishing domains, certificates and routing.
- An automated storefront with a sub-reseller tier, taking USDT, Ethereum, Alipay and WeChat Pay.
YAM Store also built fake organisations to make tenants look legitimate, including a fabricated non-profit on a recently registered .org domain [1]. The Record reports that buyers could also acquire expired domains tied to real organisations [2].
Iron Man is subscription-based. Microsoft lists geofencing, fake CAPTCHA gates, IP allow and block lists, Telegram alerts and a WebSocket channel that lets operators watch victims and control what they see in real time [1]. Downstream use was credential theft, some device code phishing and payment card fraud [1][4].
The numbers, and where they differ
Microsoft says the kits facilitated more than one billion phishing emails and SMS messages to over 75,000 organisations worldwide since January [1]. SecurityWeek and The Record report that more than 750 million of those targeted Microsoft customers, across more than 150 countries [2][3]. Operators reportedly earned tens of millions of dollars [2].
Several figures diverge between sources:
- Disabled assets: more than 20,000 accounts tied to YAM Store, per The Record and SecurityWeek, or 20,000 tenants that enabled over 140,000 malicious domains, per Dark Reading [2][3][6].
- Domains: more than 100,000 impersonation and fraud domains blocked, per The Record and SecurityWeek, or tens of thousands, per Cybersecurity Dive [2][3][5].
- Iron Man templates: 2,335 across 139 countries, per Microsoft, or 2,360 lure packages across 130 regions, per Resecurity [1][3][7].
- Investigation start: early 2025, per CyberScoop, or a late-2025 tip from Japan’s National Police Agency, per SecurityWeek and Cybersecurity Dive [3][4][5].
The court filings could not be retrieved for this article, so the authoritative versions of these figures remain unchecked.
The Japan and APAC thread
The case began in Japan. Microsoft’s Steven Masada says the investigation started after Japanese police flagged campaigns targeting people there [2]. Proofpoint documented CoGUI in 2025: active since at least October 2024, peaking at more than 172 million messages in January 2025, and mainly impersonating Amazon, PayPay, Rakuten, card issuers and Japan’s tax agency [8]. Proofpoint assessed that multiple Chinese-speaking actors used it, and found it distinct from the Darcula kit used in road-toll smishing [8].
Japan’s own reporting shows the scale of the problem. TECH+, citing the Council of Anti-Phishing Japan, reports 151,112 phishing email reports and 66,574 unique phishing URLs in April 2026. About 90.8 per cent of phishing emails used custom domains, while only about 14.0 per cent of those implemented DMARC correctly [9].
Iron Man’s catalogue extends the reach. Microsoft lists Japan, the United States, Australia and India among target countries [1]. Resecurity found 16 templates for a Philippine bank [7]. None of the sources lists Malaysian brands. A template catalogue is a sample of what was offered, not a census of who was hit.
What the takedown can and cannot do
Resecurity, which bought a licence and ran an isolated lab instance, describes Iron Man as run by a small, persistent and organised group. Its build registry showed eight accounts created between October 2025 and June 2026 [7]. The panel depends on regular contact with a licensing host, so blocking that host would degrade every active deployment [7]. That dependency is what makes supply-side disruption worth doing.
Microsoft is candid about the limit. Masada said the action makes it harder for criminals to obtain accounts, tools and infrastructure, and Cybersecurity Dive reports Microsoft acknowledging it will only dent the wider ecosystem [3][5]. The same unit, with Health-ISAC, seized 338 RaccoonO365 sites in September 2025 and 330 Tycoon 2FA domains in March 2026 [10][11]. Neither source reports what happened to those services afterwards. No arrests are reported in this case.
What to do
- Audit Global Administrator assignments, app registrations and consented Graph and SharePoint permissions. Dark Reading’s sources note that app-level access survives a password reset [1][6].
- Alert on unexpected education licence assignments and on silent password resets by applications rather than users [1].
- Require phishing-resistant MFA for privileged roles and restrict where MFA and passkeys can be registered, as Microsoft recommends [1].
- Block the device code authentication flow where it has no business use, given its use downstream of these kits [1][4].
- Do not treat SharePoint or OneDrive hosting, or an aged domain, as a trust signal in mail filtering or user training [1][2].
- Publish DMARC at enforcement on every domain you own, including parked and expired-renewal domains [2][9].
The cyber operations reading
This case shows phishing as a supply chain with separable layers: access, kits and delivery. YAM Store sold the access layer, and that layer was other organisations’ legitimate cloud tenants [1]. Every under-managed tenant is therefore potential attacker infrastructure, not only a potential victim. Disrupting the broker and the licensing host removes shared dependencies that many operators relied on at once [1][7]. It does not remove the demand. Tenant owners close the supply that a court order only interrupts.
Sources
Every R3KONX article cites its primary material. 11 sources, in order of first citation. Links open the original publication.
- The hidden network: Inside the phishing infrastructure ecosystem powering global cybercrime Microsoft Threat Intelligence · 2026-10-14
- Microsoft takes down 3 major phishing platforms used by Chinese cybercriminals The Record (Recorded Future News) · 2026-10-14
- Microsoft Disrupts Chinese-Language Phishing Market Behind 1B+ Messages SecurityWeek · 2026-10-14
- Microsoft and partners disrupt vast Chinese-language phishing kit ecosystem CyberScoop · 2026-10-14
- Microsoft, Health-ISAC and partners take down popular phishing kit services Cybersecurity Dive · 2026-10-14
- Yam Store: The Phishing Network Behind a Billion Messages Dark Reading · 2026-10-14
- Iron Man and YamStore: powering a global phishing-as-a-service ecosystem Resecurity · 2026-10-13
- CoGUI phish kit targets Japan with millions of messages Proofpoint · 2025-05-06
- April 2026 phishing report (Council of Anti-Phishing Japan monthly figures) TECH+ (Mynavi News) · 2026-05-25
- Microsoft seizes 338 websites to disrupt rapidly growing 'RaccoonO365' phishing service Health-ISAC · 2025-09-16
- Microsoft disrupts Tycoon 2FA phishing kit CyberScoop · 2026-03-04
Researched and written by the R3KONX analysis desk from the cited primary material. Microsoft's Digital Crimes Unit blog post and the court filings could not be retrieved; the court, order date and some figures come from the cited reporting, and several counts differ between sources as noted. Operator attribution is Microsoft's and Resecurity's assessment. Corrections to event@r3konx.asia.
