Storm-0940’s ConnectWise intrusion turned one vendor credential into app-only access across Microsoft 365 tenants
Microsoft assesses a China state-aligned actor used the ARTEX agentic framework to abuse ConnectWise Cloud Backup's trusted application identity. The residue to hunt is planted credentials and self-assigned roles, not the vendor secret.

The ConnectWise Cloud Backup compromise was not a breach of backups. It was a breach of trust relationships. A single vendor credential gave an intruder an app-only identity inside every Microsoft 365 tenant that had consented to the product, with no user sign-in and no MFA prompt to stop it [2][6]. On 21 October Microsoft assessed that the China state-aligned actor it tracks as Storm-0940 was responsible, and that the actor drove much of the operation with ARTEX, an open-source agentic penetration-testing framework [1][8]. In several cases, Microsoft says, the time from initial targeting to privileged access was under three hours [1].
For defenders the lesson is narrow and urgent. Any multi-tenant application holding standing, high-privilege consent in a tenant is a standing identity. If its vendor loses the credential, the tenant inherits the compromise. Rotating the vendor secret does not remove what an intruder planted in the meantime [2][4].
What the primary reporting shows
Huntress published first, on 16 October. It reported that a Microsoft 365 credential belonging to ConnectWise Cloud Backup, formerly SkyKick, had been used to obtain Microsoft Graph tokens in customer tenants [2]. The credential lived in the vendor’s own tenant, so customers could not have prevented its theft [2]. Huntress saw password spraying against four law-firm tenants on 13 and 14 October, then token activity on 15 October, and a smaller, apparently manual wave against tenants in policy, national security, trade and critical-mineral sectors [2]. It recorded the last confirmed successful sign-in at 08:44 UTC on 15 October [2].
The persistence pattern matters more than the entry point. In one partner tenant a ConnectWise Teams application assigned itself Global Administrator, and a script then added new client secrets to two other applications, one of them a security vendor’s own app [2]. Those secrets were set to expire in 2028 [2]. Microsoft describes the same class of activity across its telemetry: credentials added to existing OAuth apps and service principals, self-assigned privileged roles, app role assignments, consent changes, Graph mailbox access and, in some cases, bulk reads of secrets from Azure Key Vault [1].
Microsoft’s figures describe the front end of the operation. Between 10 and 14 October it logged more than 151,000 failed logons against 327 accounts across eight organisations, peaking at about 2,900 failures a minute, with lockouts making up nearly 98 per cent of activity and no successful authentication observed from the spray itself [1]. It also counted sign-in attempts against more than 2,250 tenants using ConnectWise-related application credentials, and bursts of over 200 sign-ins in under four minutes [1]. Microsoft lists targeted sectors including aerospace and defence, government, energy, semiconductors, legal, financial services and think tanks, but gives no country breakdown [1].
ConnectWise’s own status record shows the containment sequence. It confirmed unauthorised access to application identities on 17 October, disabled seven application identities and revoked certificates, took SaaS Security and Cloud Management offline on 18 October, and completed a full credential reset on 19 October [3]. Phased restoration began on 21 October. As of 23 October partners were told to keep affected connections disabled, with no firm date for full restoration [3]. ConnectWise says backup archives show no indication of compromise and that individual tenants still need review [3].
Where the sources differ
The tenant counts do not agree, because they measure different things. Huntress confirmed unauthorised sign-ins in 162 tenants as of 19:00 UTC on 16 October [2]. The Hacker News reported 173 tenants, attributing the figure to Huntress [6]. Huntress also reported sign-in activity from the attacker’s address against almost 1,000 Entra tenants, more than 300 of them successful [2][4]. Microsoft’s figure of more than 2,250 tenants counts attempts, not successes [1]. None of these is a victim total.
The start date also varies. Dark Reading and Cybersecurity Dive report that ConnectWise flagged unauthorised access on 14 October [4][7]. ConnectWise’s status page opens its investigation on 16 October, the date Microsoft gives for the initial advisory [3][1].
The parties also disagree on impact. ConnectWise told Dark Reading it had not identified confirmed downstream customer compromise, and says it cannot see partner or customer environments to confirm which were breached [4][5]. Huntress and Todyl argue that successful authentication into a customer tenant is itself downstream impact [4]. Microsoft says most targeting failed but that Storm-0940 achieved privileged cloud persistence at many organisations [1]. Huntress notes that Graph directory reads leave no audit record, so data access cannot be ruled out where logs look clean [2].
ARTEX is a tool, not an attribution
ARTEX appears in at least three other bodies of reporting, and the assessments are not the same. CrowdStrike assesses with moderate confidence that the operator behind intrusions at South Korean financial organisations was a Chinese speaker and financially motivated, and does not name an adversary [10]. Zscaler ThreatLabz examined an operator’s working environment and found prompts referencing organisations in 19 countries, including Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Taiwan and Japan [9]. It assesses that operator as likely Chinese-speaking and financially motivated, focused on personal data such as mobile numbers [9]. In Japan, GMO Cybersecurity by Ierae found ARTEX on infrastructure that targeted about 20 Japanese companies and identified six further AI-driven attack hosts. Eight targeted companies disclosed breaches in September and October [11][12]. eSecurity Planet notes that the tool’s origin does not establish who operated it, and that no link has been shown between the Japanese and Korean operators [13].
Microsoft’s state-aligned assessment covers Storm-0940 and the ConnectWise case. The other reports describe financially motivated activity. Treating ARTEX as a signature of one actor would be an error. The common factor is tempo. Microsoft’s point is that Storm-0940’s OAuth abuse is typical of its tradecraft, but agentic tooling moved it to machine speed [1]. The Malaysian mention comes from one vendor’s reading of prompt history, not from a confirmed Malaysian victim [9]. No other source reviewed mentions Malaysia.
What to do
- Search every Microsoft 365 tenant you manage, including dormant and inherited ones, for the ConnectWise and SkyKick applications by application ID rather than display name, using the IDs Microsoft and Huntress publish [1][2].
- Disable, do not delete. Deleting removes consent and evidence. Preserve Entra sign-in and audit logs and Graph telemetry before any irreversible change [1][2].
- Review service principal sign-ins separately from user sign-ins, from at least 15 October and back to 1 October where retention allows. Do not limit the review to published indicators [1].
- Audit every application and service principal for secrets or certificates added since 13 October that your staff did not create, and for self-assigned roles such as Global Administrator [2][14].
- Expect lingering access. Tokens issued before an app is disabled can stay valid for up to about 90 minutes [6].
- Check Conditional Access for exclusions covering these apps, restrict client secrets through application management policies, and limit who holds Application Administrator [2].
- Keep connections disabled until ConnectWise issues restoration instructions for your service, and plan for paused backups in the meantime [3][2].
Read-only tooling can speed triage across many tenants. The CIAOPS author warns that a clean result is an investigation aid, not a forensic verdict [14].
The operational picture
This campaign joins two ideas that defenders usually treat apart: supply-chain trust and automated intrusion. A state-aligned actor did not need a zero-day. It needed one vendor credential and a framework that could test thousands of trusted connections in parallel [1][7]. For managed service providers in Asia and elsewhere, the response is a standing inventory of every third-party app with app-only permissions, and monitoring of what those apps do once they are inside.
Sources
Every R3KONX article cites its primary material. 14 sources, in order of first citation. Links open the original publication.
- AI-driven, large-scale nation-state campaign using ARTEX enables supply chain compromise Microsoft Threat Intelligence · 2026-10-21
- ConnectWise (SkyKick) Vendor Credentials Abused in M365 Attacks Huntress · 2026-10-16
- ConnectWise Cloud Backup Issue Investigation ConnectWise Status · 2026-10-23
- ConnectWise Disables Cloud Backups Amid Concerns for Downstream MSPs Dark Reading · 2026-10-19
- ConnectWise suspends Cloud Backup service after supply chain attack The Record · 2026-10-19
- Hackers Use Compromised ConnectWise Credential to Sign In to 173 Microsoft 365 Tenants The Hacker News · 2026-10-17
- China-nexus actor linked to attack on ConnectWise Cloud Backup Cybersecurity Dive · 2026-10-22
- Microsoft blames ConnectWise attacks on Chinese state hacker using AI agents The Record · 2026-10-22
- Inside a Global AI-Assisted Hacking Campaign Zscaler ThreatLabz · 2026-10-21
- Unknown Threat Actor Uses AI-Driven ARTEX to Target South Korean Finance CrowdStrike · 2026-10-07
- GMOサイバーセキュリティ byイエラエ、不正アクセス攻撃元にAI自律型ペンテストシステム「ARTEX」を確認 ScanNetSecurity · 2026-10-21
- Chinese AI Tool Likely Used in Cyberattacks on Japan Firms Nippon.com (Jiji Press) · 2026-10-20
- ARTEX AI Tool Linked to Cyberattacks on Japanese Companies eSecurity Planet · 2026-10-22
- New script: Check your Microsoft 365 tenants for ConnectWise SkyKick exposure CIAOPS · 2026-10-20
Researched and written by the R3KONX analysis desk from the cited primary material. Attribution to Storm-0940 is Microsoft's assessment, tenant counts are vendor-reported and measure different things, and the only Malaysian reference is a country named in one vendor's analysis of attacker prompts. Corrections to event@r3konx.asia.
