CYOPS · Cyber Operations

FlashHole: Kaspersky sees Lazarus still entering through South Korea’s mandatory security software

Kaspersky's account of Operation FlashHole puts a trusted banking plug-in at the start of another espionage chain, with GitHub as the command channel and post-quantum key exchange protecting the payloads. The software is due to be phased out, but that will take time and the attacks have not stopped.

In Kaspersky’s assessment, Lazarus is still using South Korea’s state-mandated security software as a way in. Kaspersky’s report on Operation FlashHole, published on 21 October, traces a new espionage chain back to the service process of INISAFE CrossWeb EX. Many Korean online banking and government sites require users to install this financial security program [1]. Kaspersky assesses that Lazarus is responsible. According to Kaspersky, the group has abused the same software in 2021, 2022 and 2023 [1][3]. The novel parts of the operation are the implant’s tradecraft: a private GitHub repository serves as the command channel, and payload delivery is protected with a post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism [1][2].

What the data says

Kaspersky confirms at least three South Korean victims, in software, construction and wired communication equipment manufacturing. It says a considerably larger number of organisations is likely to be affected [1]. It responded to the intrusions in January 2026, and the earliest traces date to July 2025, shortly after its previous Lazarus operation against Korean firms, SyncHole, ended [1][3]. Software was the only sector targeted in both operations. Kaspersky suggests the aim may be source code theft or vulnerability discovery [1]. SyncHole itself hit at least six organisations through watering-hole sites, with the chain starting from a suspected flaw in Cross EX [7].

The initial access in FlashHole is only partly understood. Kaspersky observed lure sites on GitHub Pages, first a résumé and later an interior-design portfolio. The résumé photograph appeared to be AI-generated [1][4]. Kaspersky assesses with medium-to-high confidence that phishing emails pointed targets to these sites. It states plainly that it could not determine what triggered the chain or how CrossWeb EX was abused [1]. What it did see was the CrossWeb EX V3 service process launching the legitimate Windows binary fsquirt.exe, which was then injected with shellcode carrying the first-stage downloader [1][4].

From there, the chain follows a familiar Lazarus pattern with upgraded components. The TechHub downloader authenticates to a private GitHub repository with a personal access token. It uses issues to track handshake state and encrypted files to exchange data [1]. Persistence comes through DLL side-loading and a service registered under a randomised name with a generic Microsoft description. Most early stages run only in memory [1][2]. The final orchestrator, Cubridge, is the same family that Mandiant calls SIDESHOW and ESET calls LightlessCan [1][3]. ESET first documented LightlessCan in 2023 in a Dream Job intrusion against a Spanish aerospace company. It noted that the RAT reimplements Windows commands such as ipconfig and netsh internally, so they never appear as console processes [13].

The cryptography attracted the headlines. The LPEClient profiler retrieves four ML-KEM-1024 public keys, wraps the resulting ciphertexts with GOST, and uses the shared secrets to key Threefish for payload decryption [1][2]. ML-KEM-1024 is the strongest parameter set in FIPS 203, which NIST finalised in August 2024 [12]. A new loader, ClientHub, uses the SNOW stream cipher, which Kaspersky says it has not seen in Lazarus malware before [1]. Kaspersky’s own conclusion is that the group adopted post-quantum cryptography faster than many legitimate security products [1].

FlashHole is not an isolated case. In July, AhnLab published Operation Double Barrel alongside a joint advisory with Korea’s National Intelligence Service, National Police Agency, KISA and the Financial Security Institute [5]. It describes a state-sponsored group exploiting zero-days in two Korean financial security products through watering-hole and spear-phishing attacks from 2025 into the first half of 2026. The same vulnerabilities, tooling, SSH key fingerprints and infrastructure also appear in Gunra ransomware intrusions [5]. AhnLab says it cannot definitively determine the relationship between the two actors [5]. The Record, reporting on the same material, puts Lazarus backdoors in at least 72 organisations in 2026 and says 15 legitimate Korean websites were compromised for the watering holes [6]. These are separate counts from Kaspersky’s FlashHole figure, and they cover different activity.

What it means

The common factor is the software, not the lure. Academic researchers analysed Korea Security Applications at USENIX Security 2025. They found 19 vulnerabilities and showed that the software works against browser security models, including the same-origin policy and sandboxing [8][9]. In their survey of 400 users, 97 per cent of banking customers had the software installed and 59 per cent did not understand what it did. On 48 real machines, users averaged nine such programs, many of them outdated [8]. KAIST’s announcement gives 97.4 per cent and says many root causes remain, while the paper’s abstract describes the reported flaws as patched [8][9]. In the 2023 INISAFE campaign, the National Intelligence Service counted about 210 compromised PCs across more than 60 organisations and estimated that over 10 million devices had the software installed [10].

Policy has moved, but the installed base has not. In September 2025, the presidential National Security Office said it would curb the software that institutions force users to install [11]. Kaspersky says the resulting plan phases out mandatory security software from 2026, and it expects attacks exploiting it to continue until the software is removed or mitigated [1]. For a patient actor, a widely installed, highly privileged and rarely updated local service remains an attractive target.

The post-quantum element matters less for detection than the coverage suggests. Any ephemeral key exchange already stops a defender from decrypting captured payload traffic. ML-KEM simply removes the chance of doing so retrospectively. The practical effect is that network-side payload recovery is gone, so evidence must come from the endpoint and from memory. The GitHub channel works the same way: it looks like ordinary developer traffic and can rarely be blocked outright in a software company [1][4].

What to do

  • Inventory every Korea Security Applications component on corporate endpoints, including CrossWeb EX, certificate and signing agents and browser-integrated file-transfer tools. Remove those no business process needs and update the rest to vendor-current versions [1][3][8].
  • Alert when a security plug-in’s service process spawns an unexpected child process. CrossWeb EX launching fsquirt.exe is the specific case Kaspersky observed, and the process chain is a stronger lead than any network indicator [1][4].
  • Baseline GitHub API use by host. Flag authenticated access to private repositories from machines and processes with no development role [1][3].
  • Hunt for new SYSTEM services with generic Microsoft descriptions and randomised names that side-load DLLs from system directories, and check for timestomped files around them [1].
  • Capture memory before reimaging any host suspected of compromise, because the early stages run in memory and the payload exchange cannot be decrypted from packet captures [1][4].
  • Treat unsolicited résumé and portfolio links to software, construction and telecoms equipment staff as hostile until verified, and protect source repositories with MFA and access review [1][3].

The cyber operations view

FlashHole shows a mature operator reinvesting in what works. The access vector is a trusted national control that is already known to be weak, and the tooling has been refreshed rather than replaced. Kaspersky expected continued attacks on South Korea but notes it did not expect several campaigns to run in parallel, each abusing different software [1]. Double Barrel adds a further complication: the same exploit chains appear behind ransomware, whether through sharing, access brokering or collaboration [5][6]. Organisations operating in Korea, including APAC subsidiaries of foreign firms whose staff bank locally on company devices, should treat every mandated plug-in as externally reachable attack surface until it is retired.

Sources

Every R3KONX article cites its primary material. 13 sources, in order of first citation. Links open the original publication.

  1. Operation FlashHole: Lazarus breaks security, defies control Kaspersky Securelist (Sojun Ryu) · 2026-10-21
  2. Lazarus hackers use post-quantum cryptography for malware delivery BleepingComputer · 2026-10-21
  3. Lazarus Operation FlashHole Daily CyberSecurity (SecurityOnline) · 2026-10-21
  4. FlashHole: Lazarus turned security software into a way in Gridinsoft · 2026-10-22
  5. [Joint Cybersecurity Advisory] Operation Double Barrel (The relationship between a state-sponsored threat actor and the Gunra ransomware group) AhnLab Security Intelligence Center (ASEC) · 2026-07-30
  6. North Korea's Lazarus Group sharing tools with ransomware hackers, South Korean agencies warn The Record by Recorded Future News · 2026-07-30
  7. Kaspersky uncovers new Lazarus-led cyberattacks targeting South Korean supply chains Kaspersky · 2025-04-24
  8. Too Much of a Good Thing: (In-)Security of Mandatory Security Software for Financial Services in South Korea USENIX Security 2025 · 2025-08-13
  9. In South Korea, mandatory financial security software becomes a backdoor and a target KAIST School of Electrical Engineering · 2025
  10. [北 해킹위협] 정부기관 털리고 핵 기밀까지 북 해킹에 속수무책 (North Korea hacking threat, part 1) iNews24 · 2023-04-13
  11. Presidential office plans comprehensive information security plan, including curbs on mandatory security software Asia Economy · 2025-09-22
  12. FIPS 203: Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard NIST · 2024-08-13
  13. Lazarus luring employees with trojanized coding challenges: The case of a Spanish aerospace company ESET WeLiveSecurity · 2023-09-29

Researched and written by the R3KONX analysis desk from the cited primary material. Attribution to Lazarus is Kaspersky's assessment, not an independent finding. The figure of 72 organisations for the related Double Barrel activity comes from The Record's reporting of the AhnLab and joint-agency material and could not be confirmed on AhnLab's public summary page. The 2023 INISAFE figures are the National Intelligence Service's as reported by iNews24. The KAIST announcement and the USENIX abstract describe the patch status of the 19 KSA flaws differently, and both versions are given. Corrections to event@r3konx.asia.

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