CERT-UA’s Dahua warning: a camera you cannot reach from the internet is still reachable
Ukraine's CERT says attackers are taking over Dahua cameras and recorders through the vendor's peer-to-peer cloud relay, using little more than a guessable serial number. Researchers have already shown how large these campaigns get, and allied intelligence services have described what cameras are used for in this war.

Ukraine’s CERT warned last week that attackers are taking over Dahua IP cameras and digital video recorders, watching their streams, changing their configuration and creating their own accounts [1][2][3]. The route in is not an open port. It is Easy4IP, Dahua’s peer-to-peer cloud feature, which lets anyone holding a valid serial number reach a device through the manufacturer’s relay, regardless of firewall or NAT [2][3][4]. CERT-UA’s warning is blunt: the lack of direct internet access does not make the device secure [4]. The alert follows three months of public evidence that cameras are a live collection source in this war, and that more than one party is doing the collecting.
What the data says
The alert gives no device count, no time frame and no attribution [1][4]. Security Affairs dates it 23 October and Tech Times 24 October [4][15]. CERT-UA lists unauthorised access to video, configuration changes and third-party accounts as the observed activity [2][3]. Its indicators are unknown local accounts, unknown linked cloud accounts, unfamiliar text overlays on the video and audit-log entries showing DVRIP authentication from the loopback address [2][3]. CERT-UA notes that the absence of overlays proves nothing [3]. It names two 2021 authentication bypass flaws, CVE-2021-33044 and CVE-2021-33045, alongside weak or default passwords [1][4].
The serial number is the weak point. Dahua serials have 15 characters: a 10-character prefix shared across a model family, then a five-character hexadecimal counter that increases almost sequentially [2][7]. ITRES Labs’ Javier Medina estimated that this leaves about 20 bits of unpredictability once a prefix is known. He observed no effective rate limiting on invalid lookups and found that P2P is enabled by default on many builds [7]. On firmware before mid-2024, a valid serial alone opened a relay tunnel to the web console, and logins through the relay appeared on the device as local [7]. That is why CERT-UA’s loopback indicator works. Medina reports that Dahua’s PSIRT did not classify the P2P behaviour as a vulnerability [7].
Hunt.io has already measured what this looks like at scale. Its Operation CameraSwarm report, published in August, covers a 35-day campaign from 17 June to 22 July 2026. It was found when an operator’s open directory was crawled on 23 July [5]. Hunt.io counted more than 14,530 compromised Dahua devices. Of these, 12,324 were taken through credential brute-forcing of the management port, 1,923 through the 2021 bypass chain and 283 through the cloud relay with only a serial number [5]. Tech Times rounds the total to 14,500 [15]. Confirmed compromises were concentrated in Ukraine, which held the largest share, and Russia [5]. The operator’s own code records that 89.4 per cent of live serials it probed returned an open relay channel without authentication [5]. On each of the 1,923 bypassed cameras, the operator installed a backdoor account that survives a password change and, on most firmware, a factory reset [5]. Dahua fixed both flaws in 2021, and CISA added them to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue in August 2024 [5][14].
Hunt.io is cautious about who did this. The toolkit was assembled from public projects by at least six upstream developers, and running a tool is not evidence of writing it [5]. Hunt.io assesses with moderate confidence that the toolkit was built to hand access to a third party [5]. It does not tie the campaign to a state actor. It says the methods in CERT-UA’s alert closely match CameraSwarm but that it has no evidence the same operator is behind both [1]. A separate Hunt.io report in August described a Russian-speaking operator holding 58 compromised cameras, all in Ukrainian address space and some in frontline cities. That operator was not linked to a state either [6].
What it means
State demand for this access is documented. On 10 July the Dutch AIVD and MIVD said at least one Russian intelligence service was systematically compromising internet-connected cameras in the Netherlands, other EU and NATO states, and Ukraine [8][10]. According to reporting on their advisory, the cameras are used to follow military transport routes and weapons deliveries. In Ukraine they are used to locate personnel and equipment for strikes [9][11]. The services describe default passwords, outdated firmware and image-recognition software sifting the feeds, with no zero-days needed [9][11]. They found a small number of compromised cameras on Dutch military logistics routes [10]. In May 2025 an eleven-nation advisory attributed related camera targeting to GRU unit 26165. It cited a sample of more than 10,000 targeted cameras, 81 per cent of them in Ukraine, many near border crossings, military installations and rail stations [13].
Taken together, the sources show an established intelligence requirement and a commoditised supply of access. The state services describe the need. CameraSwarm shows that a single operator with public tools can compromise thousands of devices in five weeks, in a form built to be handed on [5]. For a defender, who holds a camera matters less than what it can see. A camera that overlooks a depot, a port gate or a rail siding is a sensor for whoever controls it.
Exposure counts understate the problem. After the Dutch advisory, Censys counted more than 87,000 potentially exploitable cameras across EU and NATO states and Ukraine. It called the figure a lower bound [12]. Security Affairs reported the figure as cameras running services that match known-exploited vulnerabilities [9]. Censys itself says the count covers any vulnerable service on a camera host, that limiting it to camera software leaves 541 services, and that weak credentials are excluded [12]. Neither framing captures devices reachable only through a vendor relay, because internet scanning cannot see them.
What to do
- Disable Easy4IP and P2P cloud access on every Dahua device that does not need it. Check OEM-rebranded recorders and cameras for the same setting, because they share the relay [3][4][5][7].
- Install current firmware manually from the vendor site. Removing a rogue account is not enough: Hunt.io says recovery codes stay valid until a firmware update [5][7].
- Audit local and linked cloud accounts on every camera and recorder. Remove unknown entries, including any account named p2pwn, and rotate all credentials on affected devices [3][4][5].
- Review device audit logs for authentication from the loopback address, and have network monitoring flag the bypass login parameters Hunt.io publishes [2][5].
- Keep management ports and web interfaces off the internet. Use a VPN with allowlisted addresses and put cameras on a segmented network [4][13].
- Do not block Dahua relay infrastructure by address. Hunt.io excluded those addresses from its indicators because legitimate customers depend on them, and disabling P2P is the reliable control [5].
- Check what each camera can see. Reposition or mask views of logistics routes, loading areas, docks and rail sidings, as the Dutch services and the 2025 joint advisory recommend [9][12][13].
The cyber operations view
Cameras are now a reconnaissance layer that any party can borrow, and access to them is cheap. CERT-UA’s alert adds that the usual defence, keeping the device off the open internet, fails when the vendor’s own relay brokers the connection [4][7]. None of this is confined to Ukraine. The relay is global, and Hunt.io’s largest single brute-force haul came from Mexican and Vietnamese consumer ranges before the operator narrowed its focus [5]. Operators of ports, defence logistics, rail and energy sites in the Asia-Pacific, where commodity camera fleets are common, should ask two questions about every device. Can it be reached by serial number, and what does it see?
Sources
Every R3KONX article cites its primary material. 15 sources, in order of first citation. Links open the original publication.
- Ukraine warns hackers are compromising Chinese-made Dahua cameras The Record by Recorded Future News · 2026-10-26
- Attackers Hijack Dahua IP Cameras in Ukraine Using P2P Access and Auth Weaknesses The Hacker News · 2026-10-27
- Hackers are breaking into Dahua cameras and video recorders in Ukraine dev.ua · 2026-10-27
- Attackers Take Control of Dahua Cameras and Video Recorders Via Easy4IP Security Affairs · 2026-10-27
- Operation CameraSwarm: Dahua cameras compromised Hunt.io · 2026-08-18
- Russian-speaking operator's Ukrainian camera toolkit Hunt.io · 2026-08-10
- Dahua: beyond CVE-2025-31702, P2P relay exposure ITRES Labs (Javier Medina) · 2025-10-29
- Cyberadvies: Russische statelijke actoren compromitteren IP-camera's in Europa voor militaire doeleinden AIVD and MIVD · 2026-07-10
- Dutch Intelligence Warns Russia Uses Hacked IP Cameras for Military Espionage Security Affairs · 2026-07-20
- NATO logistics, Ukrainian troops are top subjects of Russian camera hacks, advisory says The Record by Recorded Future News · 2026-07-14
- Russian hackers are hijacking internet-connected cameras to spy on NATO and Ukraine Bitdefender Hot for Security · 2026-07-21
- Inside Russia's Camera-Hacking Espionage Campaign Censys ARC (Martijn Grooten) · 2026-07-16
- Russian GRU Targeting Western Logistics Entities and Technology Companies (AA25-141A) CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies · 2025-05-21
- CISA Adds Four Known Exploited Vulnerabilities to Catalog CISA · 2024-08-21
- Hackers Compromised 14,500 Dahua Cameras via Serial Numbers, CERT-UA Now Warns Tech Times · 2026-10-27
Researched and written by the R3KONX analysis desk from the cited primary material. The CERT-UA alert on the State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection site could not be retrieved, so its content is taken from press reports that quote it; those reports date it 23 and 24 October respectively. The AIVD and MIVD brochure could not be retrieved, and its technical detail comes from press reporting of it. Attribution of camera targeting to Russian intelligence is the assessment of the issuing agencies. Hunt.io does not tie Operation CameraSwarm to any state actor, and The Record reports no evidence linking it to the cases in CERT-UA's alert. Censys and Security Affairs describe the 87,000 figure differently. Corrections to event@r3konx.asia.
