CYOPS · Cyber Operations

France attributes refrigeration sabotage to an IRGC unit while the second European wave remains unattributed

Paris names Shahid Kaveh for the October attack on about 700 retail sites. The 1–2 November wave across at least six more countries has no government attribution, and exposed controllers are still online.

The finding

France has formally attributed the sabotage of refrigeration controllers at about 700 French retail sites on 11–12 October to Shahid Kaveh, a cyber-offensive unit the Foreign Ministry describes as affiliated with the electronic and cyber centre of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) [1]. The ministry calls it the first cyber-offensive operation on French territory carried out purely for sabotage [1]. The attribution was published on 9 November alongside a joint report from France’s interministerial cyber crisis coordination centre, the C4 [1][2].

The operational lesson is narrower than the diplomacy and more urgent. The entry point was internet-exposed refrigeration management interfaces, several with vulnerabilities patched in 2025 [3][8][9]. A second wave on 1–2 November hit retailers in at least six more European countries and has not been attributed by any government [4][7][14].

What the French report says

The C4 brings together ANSSI, the DGSE, the DGSI, the armaments directorate and the cyber defence command [2]. Its report states that controllers at about 700 retail sites were compromised overnight from Sunday 11 to Monday 12 October. Defrost parameters were set to high temperatures, causing significant stock losses and at least 15 fire starts [2]. The Foreign Ministry puts food losses at tens of millions of euros [1]. Victims include large retail chains, small butchers, a slaughterhouse and cooperative food plants [2]. Schneider Electric equipment at several small hydroelectric plants was targeted at the same time, with moderate effects [2].

The attribution rests on converging indicators, not a single technical proof, and the report states no formal confidence level [2]. The C4 cites four. The attack infrastructure was also used for mass Modbus reconnaissance of Schneider Electric systems in France from April 2026. The operators used the FOFA internet-scanning service, which the C4 says this actor commonly uses. The Shahid Kaveh-linked outlet CyberbanNews relayed the attack from 13 October. Traces of Farsi were found in the infrastructure [2].

The report lists CyberAveng3rs, Soldiers of Solomon, Mr. Soul and Cyber Isnaad Front as personas the unit uses to claim operations [2]. It assigns earlier operations against Charlie Hebdo in 2023 and a display contractor linked to the Paris 2024 Games to a separate IRGC unit, Shahid Shoostari, known in open sources as Emennet Pasargad [2]. France will summon Iran’s ambassador and propose new EU sanctions [1]. Iran’s Foreign Ministry was reported on 11 November to have “categorically” rejected the accusation [15].

The second wave and the attribution gap

ENISA, the European Commission, Europol’s EC3, the EU CSIRTs Network and EU-CyCLONe issued a joint statement on 4 November. It records a new wave on 1–2 November across several member states and calls for “immediate action to mitigate exposure” [4]. Reported cases include around 40 Delhaize stores and other retailers in Belgium [12], 13 SuperValu stores in Ireland [16], one Selver store in Estonia [17], and stores in Sweden, the Netherlands, Portugal and Italy [14]. Sweden’s NCSC confirmed incidents in Swedish grocery retail and named no actor [11].

Assessments of who ran this wave differ, and we set them out as they stand. The French attribution covers October only [1][2]. Lupovis chief executive Xavier Bellekens told VRT that hosting providers and addresses used in the attacks had previously appeared in infrastructure linked to Russian state-affiliated groups, while stating that Lupovis cannot identify the perpetrators with certainty [13]. Nextgov reported that US officials suspect Iran-linked actors in freezer malfunctions at roughly six US military commissaries from late August [6]. Suppliers in Belgium, Estonia and Sweden said the method resembled the French attack; a shared method does not establish a shared actor [14].

Lupovis also reports 256 attempts from 91 sources against a decoy Danfoss controller between 20 and 30 October, with a spike on 26 October that it reads as pre-attack reconnaissance [13]. Reporting on French blood services also diverges: Nextgov describes refrigeration attacks on three regional blood banks [6], while Infosecurity Magazine reports cold rooms at the national blood service driven to 110°C [5]. Neither figure has been confirmed by a primary authority we could retrieve.

The exposure that made it possible

CERT-FR’s alert covers Danfoss AK-SM and AK-SC controllers, Copeland xweb and Dixell xweb. It states that exposing a management interface to the internet contradicts good practice and that campaigns are probably still ongoing [3]. Danfoss has published fixes for an authentication bypass, CVE-2025-41450, and for post-authentication command injection and configuration flaws, CVE-2025-41451 and CVE-2025-41452, in the AK-SM 8xxA series [10]. Claroty Team82 showed in August 2026 that the first two could be chained for remote code execution, and recommends firmware R4.3.1 or later [9]. Danfoss has not confirmed the initial access vector in the attacks [8].

Censys found that 61% of exposed Danfoss StoreView devices were in France before the attack. In ten of the twelve countries with most exposed hosts, more than 60% ran firmware older than 4.3.1 [8]. Between 9 October and 5 November, exposed StoreView hosts fell from 3,004 to 708 and Copeland/Dixell XWEB hosts from 3,708 to 2,420 [7]. Patched and unpatched devices left the internet at the same rate, which Censys reads as disconnection rather than patching [8]. In Belgium, the CCB warned operators on 13 October; a separate survey cited by The Brussels Times found about 700 controllers exposed, roughly 400 apparently vulnerable [12].

In the United States, CISA, the FBI and the departments of Health and Human Services, Agriculture and Transportation issued joint guidance on 5 November. It warns of forced continuous heating and defrost cycles and loss of temperature visibility, via authentication bypass, code injection and weak configuration [5][6]. The CISA pages were not retrievable for this piece; the guidance is cited through these reports.

What to do

  • Take controller and supervisor interfaces off the public internet. Permit remote access only through a VPN or protected network. Filtering by contractor IP address is an emergency measure, not a fix [3][5].
  • Review the full configuration of every unit, especially defrost ranges and temperature alarm thresholds, before returning it to service [3].
  • For Danfoss AK-SM devices, move to R4.3.1 or later, set the security level to Strict and replace default passwords [3][9].
  • Treat unsupported controllers left exposed as likely compromised. A factory reset removes persistence but leaves the device vulnerable; plan replacement [3][5].
  • Inventory internet-connected OT, disconnect what does not need connectivity, and rehearse an incident routine [11].
  • Check insurance and maintenance contract terms before cutting a contractor’s data feed, then agree a secure access path with the contractor [3].
  • Alert on set-point and defrost changes outside maintenance windows. EU entities under NIS2 must report significant incidents; manufacturers have had to report actively exploited vulnerabilities under the Cyber Resilience Act since 11 September 2026 [4].

Why it matters for cyber operations

The C4 describes Shahid Kaveh as conducting large-scale ICS sabotage mainly against Israel and the United States, including a March–April 2026 campaign that reached Israeli refrigeration equipment [2]. The Register notes that the US government has not attributed a July 2026 campaign against more than 100 exposed water systems, which private analysts linked to CyberAv3ngers [18]. The pattern is cheap, scan-driven disruption of commodity OT at national scale, followed by persona claims.

Attribution, warrants and sanctions raise the political cost. They do not reduce exposure. Censys measured the post-November decline across 32 countries for Danfoss and 36 for Copeland [7]. Cold-chain operators outside Europe, including in Asia, should check their own exposure now rather than wait for a local incident.

Sources

Every R3KONX article cites its primary material. 18 sources, in order of first citation. Links open the original publication.

  1. Déclaration d'attribution à l'Iran de cyberattaques visant la France Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères (France) · 2026-11-09
  2. Activités cyber offensives ciblant la France menées par des acteurs iraniens liés au CGRI (CERTFR-2026-CTI-009, C4 joint report) CERT-FR / ANSSI on behalf of the Centre de Coordination des Crises Cyber · 2026-11-09
  3. Incident de sécurité ciblant les contrôleurs à distance des installations de réfrigération (CERTFR-2026-ALE-012) CERT-FR / ANSSI · 2026-10-16
  4. Joint statement on cyber incidents in refrigeration systems across the EU ENISA · 2026-11-04
  5. CISA, FBI Urge Action to Protect Industrial Refrigeration Networks Infosecurity Magazine · 2026-11-06
  6. US agencies warn of refrigeration hacks amid suspected attacks on military bases Nextgov/FCW · 2026-11-05
  7. European Refrigeration Controller Exposure: A Second Attack Wave Censys · 2026-11-05
  8. Frostbitten in France: A Danfoss StoreView Internet Exposure Report Censys · 2026-10-14
  9. Freeze the Controller, Defrost the Food: Uncovering Vulnerabilities in Danfoss Refrigeration Controllers Claroty Team82 · 2026-08-09
  10. Danfoss security advisories Danfoss · 2025-08
  11. Cyberangrepp mot uppkopplade frys- och kylsystem Nationellt cybersäkerhetscenter (NCSC Sweden) · 2026-11-02
  12. Belgian supermarkets were warned of cyber risks: could the attacks have been prevented? The Brussels Times · 2026-11
  13. Cyberattack on supermarket refrigeration systems "may be the work of hackers with links to Russia" VRT NWS · 2026-11-04
  14. New Wave of Refrigeration Cyberattacks Hits Supermarkets Across Europe, Forcing Stores to Pull Food The Hacker News · 2026-11-03
  15. France Blames Iran for Supermarket Fridge Hacks; Tehran Denies It HNGN · 2026-11-11
  16. SuperValu removes frozen and chilled food from 13 stores after cyber attack on fridges The Irish Times · 2026-11-02
  17. Hackers raised freezer temperature at Selver supermarket to 50 C ERR News · 2026-11-02
  18. France blames Iran for supermarket hack meltdowns The Register · 2026-11-09

Researched and written by the R3KONX Analysis Desk from the primary material cited below. The US joint guidance could not be retrieved from cisa.gov and is cited through press restatements, and attribution of the November wave rests on statements by individual companies and officials rather than any government finding. Corrections: event@r3konx.asia.

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