France pins supermarket refrigeration sabotage on IRGC unit Shahid Kaveh
Paris has attributed the October overnight sabotage of refrigeration controllers at about 700 retail sites to an IRGC cyber unit. The operation used exposed interfaces and setpoint changes, not novel malware, and regulators from Washington to Singapore are now warning cold-chain operators.
A state sabotage operation that needed no exploit
France has publicly attributed the overnight sabotage of supermarket refrigeration on 11–12 October 2026 to Shahid Kaveh, an offensive unit of the IRGC Electronic and Cyber Center [1][2]. The Foreign Ministry calls it the first cyber-offensive campaign on French soil conducted purely for sabotage [1]. The operation did not depend on novel tooling. Attackers logged into internet-exposed supervisory controllers and changed defrost and alarm settings [3][12]. That is the finding practitioners should act on: a state actor converted routine building OT exposure into physical damage across a national retail estate in one night.
The attribution came on 9 November from the Centre de coordination des crises cyber (C4), which groups ANSSI, COMCYBER, the DGA, the DGSE and the DGSI [2]. The Foreign Ministry summoned Iran’s ambassador and proposed new EU sanctions [1]. The Paris prosecutor has opened a judicial investigation [12].
What the data says
The C4 report describes its case as a convergence of indicators rather than a single proof [2]. It cites reuse of the attack infrastructure for Modbus reconnaissance of Schneider Electric equipment at small French energy and water sites, use of the FOFA device-search engine, Persian-language traces in the infrastructure, and relay of the attack on 13 October by CyberbanNews, an outlet the C4 links to the unit [2]. The same report places the operation alongside earlier activity it attributes to a sister unit, Shahid Shoostari, including the 2023 Charlie Hebdo breach and a 2024 attempt to push doctored images to public displays before the Paris Olympics [2].
Check Point notes that France identifies CyberAv3ngers as one of Shahid Kaveh’s public-facing personas [5]. That persona was named in a 2023 joint US–Israeli advisory on IRGC-affiliated compromise of Unitronics PLCs through default passwords [17]. The technique has not changed much in three years.
CERT-FR’s alert lists four product families: Danfoss AK-SM and AK-SC, Copeland xweb and Dixell xweb [3]. It names no CVE and lists no indicators [3]. Sekoia, which deployed Danfoss honeypots on 12 October, recorded password spraying against Supervisor and admin accounts with a trivial password, and an unauthenticated account-rename attempt on 1 November that it says may belong to a larger, non-public chain [4]. Sekoia did not confirm that the Team82-disclosed CVE-2025-41450 was used [4]. It assesses that the French wave and the 1–2 November wave elsewhere in Europe may have been conducted by the same actor [4]. French authorities have not extended their attribution to that second wave [12].
Exposure was large. Claroty Team82 counted 2,765 internet-visible AK-SM 800A units in Censys data [6]; Sekoia puts the figure at more than 2,700 on 11 October, about 1,700 in France [4]. Infosecurity Magazine reports a 53% fall in exposed Danfoss StoreView and Copeland/Dixell XWEB controllers by 5 November, citing Censys [11].
Where the figures differ
- French sites hit: the C4 says about 700 [2]; the Foreign Ministry says more than 700 [1]; early reporting summarised by BleepingComputer gave 250 to 350 [10]. CSA Labs notes the same spread [14].
- Fires: the C4 reports at least 15 fire incidents [2]; The Hacker News reports the prosecutor’s figure as about 20 [12].
- Second-wave scope: BleepingComputer reports more than 115 stores in six countries [10]; Infosecurity Magazine says at least nine countries [11]; Sekoia says about a dozen [4]. Store counts in that wave came from individual retailers, not a central authority [13].
- Fixed firmware: Team82 says AK-SM 800A firmware R4.3.1 addresses all three flaws it disclosed [6]. Danfoss’s advisory list shows the authentication bypass fixed in version 4.2 and the post-authentication issues in 4.3.1 [7]. Either way, R4.3.1 or later is the floor.
What it means
Three points matter for defenders. First, the payload was configuration. Sekoia says the first wave changed temperature setpoints, defrost cycles and alarm thresholds with no code execution [4]. Detection built around malware will miss it. Second, the controller that was manipulated is often the one that raises the temperature alarm, so the victim’s own monitoring can be silenced [14]. Third, much of this equipment is run by refrigeration contractors outside the retailer’s IT programme and asset inventory [14]. Danfoss told reporters that most units hit in France were older AK-SM 800 and AK-SC 355 models [13]. CSA Labs notes the R4.3.1 patch does not cover those end-of-life units [14]. CERT-FR states that a factory reset alone is insufficient for them and that they remain likely to be compromised again if left exposed [3].
The consequences were physical. Sekoia reports that three French Blood Establishment sites had cold rooms set to 110°C before staff intervened [4]. The US joint fact sheet from CISA, the FBI and partner agencies warns of fire hazards and loss of temperature visibility [10]. CISA’s Chris Butera said:
Chris Butera, CISA, as quoted by BleepingComputer and Infosecurity Magazine [10][11]: “Every organization that depends on refrigeration and monitoring systems should assume it could be a target.”
What to do
- Inventory every supervisory refrigeration and building controller, including contractor-managed units, and ask providers in writing how they reach each one [9][14].
- Remove direct internet exposure now. CERT-FR advises checking insurance terms before cutting a contractor’s data feed, but not leaving the interface public [3].
- Restore remote access only through a VPN or protected network. CERT-FR treats firewall allow-listing of contractor IPs as an emergency measure, not a fix [3].
- Change default passwords, set Danfoss security level to Strict and update firmware; replace end-of-life units [3][8].
- Audit defrost schedules, setpoints, alarm thresholds and user accounts against a known-good baseline; log and alert on configuration changes [3][4][8].
- Add temperature monitoring that does not depend on the supervisory controller, and test manual fallback procedures [8][14][15].
- Hunt in web logs for password spraying against Supervisor and admin accounts. Sekoia logged exploitation attempts on 1 November from 178.83.226[.]215 and 37.16.75[.]128; it does not attribute them [4].
The cyber operations view from Kuala Lumpur
This is now an APAC operating concern. Singapore’s Cyber Security Agency issued an advisory on 6 November using the European incidents to warn that poorly secured remote access to OT can let threat actors manipulate physical processes [8]. It names cold storage, healthcare facility management, HVAC and utilities among sectors at risk [8]. In Malaysia, UNIMY adjunct professor Murugason R. Thangaratnam told Bernama that weak default passwords and exposed equipment make such attacks simple, and that untested fallback plans are not plans [15]. Team82’s researcher made the same point to Australian industry in August, before the attacks [16].
The wider lesson is doctrinal. A state unit with a hacktivist persona chose a soft, distributed, civilian target and achieved national-scale disruption with credential abuse and setpoint changes [2][5]. Sweden’s NCSC advises organisations to assume OT devices contain vulnerabilities and to build layered protection [9]. Regional operators of cold chains, hospitals and logistics hubs should treat their contractor-managed controllers as part of the attack surface now, before the technique travels.
Sources
Every R3KONX article cites its primary material. 17 sources, in order of first citation. Links open the original publication.
- Déclaration d'attribution à l'Iran de cyberattaques visant la France Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères (France Diplomatie) · 2026-11-09
- CERTFR-2026-CTI-009: Activités cyber offensives ciblant la France menées par des acteurs iraniens liés au CGRI CERT-FR / Centre de coordination des crises cyber (C4) · 2026-11-09
- CERTFR-2026-ALE-012: Incident de sécurité affectant des contrôleurs de réfrigération à distance CERT-FR · 2026-10-16
- The cold chain on fire: unpatched Danfoss controllers exploited Sekoia TDR · 2026-11-10
- From water systems to supermarket refrigerators: inside Shahid Kaveh and CyberAv3ngers' OT attacks Check Point · 2026-11-11
- Freeze the controller, defrost the food: uncovering vulnerabilities in Danfoss refrigeration controllers Claroty Team82 · 2026-08-09
- Danfoss security advisories Danfoss · 2025-08-01
- Advisory on cyberattacks targeting remotely accessible operational technology control systems (AD-2026-014) Cyber Security Agency of Singapore · 2026-11-06
- Cyberangrepp mot uppkopplade frys- och kylsystem Nationellt cybersäkerhetscenter (NCSC Sweden) · 2026-11-02
- FBI, CISA warn of cyberattacks targeting refrigeration systems BleepingComputer · 2026-11-05
- CISA, FBI urge action to protect industrial refrigeration networks Infosecurity Magazine · 2026-11-05
- France blames Iran for sabotage attack on refrigeration controllers at about 700 retail sites The Hacker News · 2026-11-10
- Second wave of cyberattacks hits supermarket refrigeration across Europe The Hacker News · 2026-11-03
- When fridges fail together: correlated OT risk in supermarket refrigeration Cloud Security Alliance Labs · 2026-11-03
- Malaysia must bolster cyber resilience as Europe supermarket attacks expose risks – expert Bernama · 2026-11-11
- Warning to update controllers Climate Control News · 2026-08-12
- CISA and partners release joint advisory on IRGC-affiliated cyber actors exploiting PLCs CISA · 2023-12-01
Researched and written by the R3KONX Analysis Desk from the primary material cited below. Attribution is that of the French government (C4) and is reported as such; the C4 describes it as a convergence of indicators. Site, fire and country counts differ between sources and are given side by side. The US CISA/FBI fact sheet could not be retrieved from cisa.gov and is cited via BleepingComputer and Infosecurity Magazine reporting. The Paris prosecutor's statement could not be retrieved and is cited via The Hacker News. Corrections: event@r3konx.asia.
