Operation Endgame hits Gootloader, CastleRAT and StealC: the credentials outlive the servers
Police in at least nine countries took down 235 servers and 257 domains behind three initial-access families. The infrastructure is gone for now. The 6.4 million victim datasets recovered from it are the part defenders need to act on.
Law enforcement has again removed the delivery layer of the ransomware economy. It has not removed what that layer already stole. In the week of 9 November 2026, agencies working under Operation Endgame took down 235 servers and 257 domains used by the Gootloader loader, the CastleRAT remote access trojan and the StealC infostealer, and identified 6.4 million victim datasets on the seized systems [1]. For defenders, those datasets are the actionable output. Much of the infrastructure will be rebuilt. Stolen credentials and sessions stay valid until someone revokes them.
What was taken down
The Operation Endgame release breaks the action down by family [1]:
- Gootloader: 14 servers and 218 domains taken down, and 681 infected websites remediated [1].
- CastleRAT: 120 servers and 39 domains seized [1].
- StealC: 102 servers dismantled, continuing an action against the same family in June 2026 [1].
The per-family server counts sum to 236, one more than the 235 headline figure. The published material does not explain the difference [1][8]. Accounts of who took part also vary. BleepingComputer and CyberScoop list nine countries: Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Moldova, the Netherlands, Poland, the United Kingdom and the United States [6][7]. The US Justice Department’s partner list also names the Paris cybercrime unit and the Australian Federal Police [2]. We report the action as involving at least nine countries.
The Justice Department said that, with court authorisation, it and the FBI removed Gootloader from more than 100 servers, including compromised WordPress sites, and seized US domains used to deliver and control the malware [2]. That figure is larger than the 14 Gootloader servers in the European tally, probably because it counts compromised hosting sites as well as operator infrastructure. Neither release says so directly. No arrests or charges were announced. The Justice Department release names prosecutors but no defendants [2][6].
Gootloader: a quiet, durable access broker
The Justice Department says Gootloader has infected at least 25,000 computers worldwide since 2018. It also says the malware was the initial infection in ransomware attacks on at least 44 US-based victims, with about USD 28.8 million in losses [2]. Court documents unsealed that week describe the business model. Victims downloaded the malware by mistake, their machines joined a botnet, and the operators sold access to ransomware gangs [5]. The German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), as reported by Lovguiden, dates the malware to 2020 rather than 2018 [8]. The two dates are both published, and they differ.
The lure has barely changed. Operators plant fake legal documents and templates on compromised websites, often WordPress, and push them up search results [1][8]. When Gootloader came back in late 2025, Huntress documented a custom web font that made obfuscated strings in the page source display as readable filenames, which defeats keyword searches. Huntress tied the loader to an operator Microsoft tracks as Storm-0494, which hands access to Vanilla Tempest for ransomware deployment [9]. In one case Huntress investigated, the domain controller was compromised about 17 hours after first execution. The DFIR Report saw lateral movement to a domain controller within an hour [9].
Canada’s RCMP says its Vancouver cybercrime team and technical investigators built a tool that removes Gootloader from infected machines. Agencies in Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands and the US used it [4]. The RCMP puts remediated websites at about 672, against Europol’s 681 [1][4].
CastleRAT and StealC: the credential pipeline
CastleRAT is newer. Recorded Future’s Insikt Group attributes it to a developer it tracks as GrayBravo, formerly TAG-150, which it assesses runs a malware-as-a-service operation. It describes C and Python variants, with the C build adding browser credential theft, keylogging and screen capture. Delivery runs through phishing, ClickFix social engineering, malvertising and fake software installers [10].
Shadowserver’s special report shows how much this one family collected. Dutch police provided 2,795,880 infostealer events, covering 2,501,763 unique login URL and account pairs. Those pairs relate to websites on 191,997 IP addresses across 9,872 networks in 161 countries or territories [3]. The location data describes where the affected websites are hosted, not where victims are. Shadowserver sends the data to system owners and national CSIRTs [3].
StealC shows the limits of a single takedown. The BKA said its operators had rebuilt infrastructure after the June 2026 action, partly on the bulletproof host Virtualine, also known as Omegatech [8]. Dutch and German police and the FBI acted against Virtualine in late October 2026. Dutch police seized dozens of physical servers, and TRM Labs found that the service had received payments from StealC operators [11]. Prosecutors allege that Virtualine openly advertised to criminals and accepted bitcoin directly to unhosted wallets [12]. The BKA’s Carsten Meywirth framed the November action as persistence: “Anyone who rebuilds their infrastructure after police measures leaves new traces, which we follow” [8].
There is also a measure of what a takedown changes in practice. SpyCloud’s analysis of the June action found that StealC infections dropped after it, but rival stealers held their levels. Overall credential exposure did not fall [13]. Demand for stolen access moves to whichever family is still working.
What it means
Three points matter to practitioners. First, these families are suppliers to the market rather than end users. Gootloader sold access and StealC sold credentials [5][1]. Disrupting them raises costs for ransomware crews but does not take any one crew out. Second, the recovered data shows exposure that already exists. A password or session cookie stolen months ago works until it is revoked. Third, the operators’ reliance on bulletproof hosting, and on hacked WordPress sites for delivery, means some of an organisation’s own web estate may have been part of the attack infrastructure [1][11].
The data spans 161 countries or territories, and the Australian Federal Police is listed as a partner [2][3]. Organisations in Malaysia and the wider region should not assume this is a European or North American problem. Notification will come through national CSIRTs or directly from Shadowserver to network owners [3].
What to do
- Act on any Shadowserver or national CSIRT notification: reset the named credentials, revoke active sessions and tokens, and check the accounts for misuse [3][13].
- Check corporate domains and staff addresses against the notification services Europol named, including Have I Been Pwned, and treat a match as a likely infected endpoint, not just a leaked password [1].
- If you run WordPress, follow Europol’s advice. Rotate administrator credentials, enable multi-factor authentication, patch, and audit for unexpected administrator accounts and injected scripts [1][7].
- Hunt for Gootloader-style follow-on activity: unusual script and PowerShell execution from user download folders, new startup persistence, Active Directory enumeration, and remote management traffic to domain controllers [9].
- Train staff on ClickFix-style prompts and fake installer downloads, which Recorded Future identifies as CastleLoader delivery paths [10].
- Assume the infrastructure will return. Keep detections tuned to behaviour, which survives a rebuild, as well as to infrastructure indicators, which do not [8][13].
Close
Operation Endgame is now in its fourth season, and its pattern is clear. Each round takes out servers, recovers stolen data and forces operators to rebuild [1]. The servers are law enforcement’s target. The credentials are the defender’s. For cyber operations teams, the useful measure of this action is how quickly exposed accounts are revoked once notifications arrive, not the seizure count.
Sources
Every R3KONX article cites its primary material. 13 sources, in order of first citation. Links open the original publication.
- Operation Endgame: 6.4 million victim datasets secured (Gootloader, CastleRAT, StealC) Operation Endgame (Europol and partner agencies) · 2026-11-12
- Gootloader Malware Disrupted in International Cyber Operation US Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs · 2026-11-12
- CastleRAT Historical Bot Infection Special Report (Stolen Credentials) The Shadowserver Foundation · 2026-11-13
- Operation Endgame – RCMP and international partners take action on cybercriminal networks Royal Canadian Mounted Police · 2026-11-13
- DOJ: Gootloader used in at least 44 ransomware attacks costing $29 million since 2018 The Record by Recorded Future News · 2026-11-13
- Police dismantles Gootloader, CastleRAT, StealC malware infrastructure BleepingComputer · 2026-11-12
- International operation dismantles malware networks, exposes 6.4 million stolen credentials CyberScoop · 2026-11-12
- Operation Endgame: 235 servers behind Gootloader, CastleRAT and StealC shut down Lovguiden · 2026-11-12
- Gootloader Returns: What Goodies Did They Bring? Huntress · 2025-11-05
- GrayBravo's CastleLoader Activity Clusters Target Multiple Industries Recorded Future Insikt Group · 2025-12-09
- Police seize Virtualine bulletproof service tied to ransomware, cybercrime BleepingComputer · 2026-10-28
- International Law Enforcement Seizes Domain of Virtualine Bulletproof Hosting Service Chainalysis · 2026-10-27
- Peers Held, StealC Didn't: Analyzing the June 24 Takedown in SpyCloud's Data SpyCloud · 2026-07-13
Researched and written by the R3KONX Analysis Desk from the cited primary material. Takedown figures are as published by the participating agencies and differ in places between releases; no indicators of compromise were independently validated. Corrections: event@r3konx.asia.
