CYOPS · Cyber Operations

SafePay advisory: 600 victims, and every edge flaw it names was already on the Akira list

A six-agency #StopRansomware advisory published on 20 October puts SafePay among the most active ransomware groups of 2026. Its initial-access CVEs are all between one and six years old, and all five were already named in the Akira advisory a year earlier.

SafePay has compromised at least 600 organisations since August 2024, according to a joint #StopRansomware advisory released on 20 October 2026 [1]. The advisory describes the group as among the most active ransomware operations of 2026 [1][2]. It was co-sealed by the FBI, CISA and the US Secret Service, Germany’s Landeskriminalamt Rheinland-Pfalz, the UK National Crime Agency and the UK North West Regional Organised Crime Unit [1]. The finding that matters for defenders is not the victim count. It is the access list. Every edge-device vulnerability the advisory names was already listed for Akira in a joint advisory updated in November 2025 [1][9].

What the advisory says

The agencies report SafePay activity since August 2024, with indicators observed from November 2024 to August 2026 [1]. Victims are in North America, South America, Europe and Australia, across multiple critical infrastructure sectors [1]. The Record’s coverage describes the 600 organisations as across the US and Europe; the advisory itself also names South America and Australia [1][2]. TechNadu reports that the FBI, Secret Service and Rheinland-Pfalz investigations behind the advisory were active as recently as August 2026 [4].

Initial access relies on credentials. The advisory lists credential theft, password guessing and brute force, abuse of VPN access, phished account profiles and connections from Mullvad VPN addresses [1]. It names two Cisco edge flaws, CVE-2020-3259 and CVE-2023-20269. It also describes automated scripts against internet-exposed systems using CVE-2023-27532, CVE-2024-40711 and CVE-2024-40766 [1][2].

Post-compromise activity uses legitimate tooling. The advisory lists PsExec, WinRM and RDP for lateral movement, ShareFinder.ps1 and SharpShares for share discovery, Mimikatz for credentials, and AnyDesk and TeamViewer to deploy the payload [1]. Data is staged with 7-Zip, WinRAR or RClone and leaves through WinSCP, RClone, Backblaze B2 or OneDrive [1][3]. The operators change user passwords to lock out legitimate staff, stop the Volume Shadow Copy Service and reset network-attached storage to factory settings to destroy backups [1]. Extortion includes a leak site and telephone calls to victims, with demands set as a share of company revenue [1][2].

The same doors Akira used

The joint Akira advisory, last updated on 13 November 2025, lists eight CVEs for initial access [9]. The five edge CVEs in the SafePay advisory are all among them [1][9]. None is new. CVE-2020-3259 is a Cisco ASA memory disclosure that Truesec showed can expose clear-text credentials of recently connected VPN users, whether the backend is local, RADIUS or LDAP [12]. CVE-2023-20269 allows brute force against Cisco ASA and FTD remote-access VPN; Ireland’s NCSC noted in 2023 that it does not bypass authentication, so MFA limits it [11].

CVE-2023-27532 lets an unauthenticated user request encrypted credentials from Veeam Backup & Replication over TCP 9401 [13]. CVE-2024-40711 is an unauthenticated deserialisation flaw in the same product, rated 9.8 [14]. CVE-2024-40766 is an access control flaw in SonicOS, rated 9.3 [15]. Australia’s ACSC warned in September 2025 of a rise in active exploitation of it against Australian organisations, linked to Akira, and stressed that patched devices remain exposed if passwords are not changed [10].

The practical reading is that two separate ransomware operations have been fed by the same small set of edge and backup weaknesses for at least two years. The advisory does not say how SafePay obtained its credentials or whether it bought access. Treating this as an Akira-SafePay relationship would go beyond the evidence.

Where the sources diverge

Start date differs. The advisory says activity began in August 2024 [1]. DCSO first noticed the group around November 2024 and gives October 2024 elsewhere in its report [7]. BleepingComputer says it was first seen in November 2024 [8]. Huntress investigated SafePay intrusions in October 2024 [5].

Encryption is described three ways. The advisory states a ChaCha20 and RSA hybrid [1]. DCSO reports AES-CBC where AES-NI is available, ChaCha20 otherwise, and Curve25519 for key material [7]. Acronis describes AES file keys wrapped with RSA [6]. Samples may differ by build; defenders should not rely on any single description.

Lineage is broadly agreed. Huntress found extensive overlap with leaked LockBit Black source code [5]. DCSO found shared architecture with LockBit 3 but assesses independent development inspired by it [7]. Security Affairs reads the advisory as describing an independent operation with no affiliate model [3]. DCSO notes that the no-RaaS statement comes from the group’s own leak site [7]. Acronis also assesses centralised operations [6].

Earlier victim counts come from leak-site tracking and are not verified. Acronis counted more than 200 in the first quarter of 2025 [6]. DCSO counted 169 listings in May 2025 [7]. BleepingComputer reported more than 220 by July 2025 [8]. Huntress says the group claimed over 270 victims in 2025 [5]. The 600 figure is the agencies’ own [1]. Named victims in coverage include Ingram Micro, where attribution rested on the ransom note and the company did not name a group [8], and Conduent and Microlise [2].

What to do

  • Confirm Cisco ASA and FTD, SonicWall SonicOS and Veeam Backup & Replication are on fixed releases for the five CVEs, using the vendor advisories, and treat these as overdue rather than new [11][13][14][15].
  • Rotate VPN and directory credentials after patching. CVE-2020-3259 and CVE-2024-40766 can expose passwords that survive the firmware update [10][12].
  • Enforce MFA on every VPN, webmail and administrative path; the advisory and NCSC guidance both treat it as the main limit on credential-based access [1][11].
  • Block external access to Veeam services, including TCP 9401, and keep backup servers off networks reachable from the internet [13].
  • Keep at least one offline, immutable backup copy. NAS devices on the production network can be factory-reset by the attacker [1].
  • Alert on VPN logins from commercial VPN ranges such as Mullvad, unexpected password resets, Defender being disabled through the Settings interface, and bulk WinRAR or RClone use [1][3][5].
  • Take indicators and the full ATT&CK mapping from the advisory itself rather than from secondary coverage [1][3].

The cyber operations view

SafePay shows how little new capability a ransomware group needs to reach 600 victims. Its access list is a reused inventory of VPN, firewall and backup flaws disclosed between 2020 and 2024 [1][9]. Its tradecraft is administrator tooling. Its distinctive move is destroying backups before the encryptor runs [1].

For APAC defenders, Australia is the named regional victim country [1], and the ACSC has already reported active SonicWall exploitation there [10]. The same appliances are widely deployed across the region. A team that closed out the Akira advisory with patches alone has not closed out this one. The test is whether VPN credentials were rotated, MFA covers every remote path, and the backup server is out of reach.

Sources

Every R3KONX article cites its primary material. 15 sources, in order of first citation. Links open the original publication.

  1. #StopRansomware: SafePay Ransomware (AA26-293A) FBI, CISA, USSS, LKA Rheinland-Pfalz, UK NCA, NWROCU · 2026-10-20
  2. FBI says SafePay ransomware gang 'among most active' with more than 600 victims since 2024 The Record · 2026-10-20
  3. FBI and CISA warn of SafePay ransomware attacks on 600 organizations Security Affairs · 2026-10-22
  4. SafePay Ransomware: FBI, CISA Advisory Urges Organizations to Take Security Measures, Warns of 600+ Victims TechNadu · 2026-10-21
  5. SafePay Ransomware: How It Works and How to Stop It Huntress · 2026-07-17
  6. SafePay ransomware: The fast-rising threat targeting MSPs Acronis Threat Research Unit · 2025-07-08
  7. SafePay: The new kid on the block DCSO CyTec · 2025-05-27
  8. Ingram Micro outage caused by SafePay ransomware attack BleepingComputer · 2025-07-05
  9. #StopRansomware: Akira Ransomware (AA24-109A, updated) FBI, CISA, DC3, HHS, Europol EC3 and partners · 2025-11-13
  10. Ongoing active exploitation of SonicWall SSL VPNs in Australia ASD's ACSC · 2025-09-10
  11. Cisco remote access VPN unauthorised access vulnerability (CVE-2023-20269) NCSC Ireland · 2023-09-13
  12. Akira and Cisco AnyConnect: the working exploit for CVE-2020-3259 Truesec · 2024-05-08
  13. Security Advisory 2023-016: Critical vulnerability in Veeam Backup & Replication (CVE-2023-27532) CERT-EU · 2023-03-09
  14. Veeam vulnerabilities (CVE-2024-40711) NCSC Ireland · 2024-09-10
  15. Security Advisory 2024-089: Critical vulnerability in SonicWall SonicOS (CVE-2024-40766) CERT-EU · 2024-08-26

Researched and written by the R3KONX analysis desk from the cited primary material. The CISA web version of advisory AA26-293A could not be retrieved; the article relies on the identical joint advisory published on the FBI's IC3 site. Victim counts before the advisory come from vendor tracking of the group's leak site and are not independently verified. Corrections to event@r3konx.asia.

R3KONX 2027

Work in this domain? So does the programme

4–6 May 2027, World Trade Centre Kuala Lumpur. Curated talks, hands-on training and The BattleGrid.