ELINT · Electronic Intelligence

Schiphol jamming: seven aircraft needed help, and ground-based backups did the work

On 9 November suspected jamming from the North Sea degraded GPS for dozens of aircraft approaching the Netherlands. The only figure every source agrees on is seven. The safe outcome rested on navaids that several states are planning to retire.

On the evening of Monday 9 November 2026, satellite navigation failed for aircraft approaching Amsterdam Schiphol. At least seven aircraft reported navigation problems on approach. All seven landed safely with air traffic control assistance [1][2][3][8]. That is the only figure the sources share. The rest of the event is estimates, and the estimates disagree.

The event became public six days later, when NRC reported it on 15 November [3]. The Rijksinspectie Digitale Infrastructuur (RDI), the Dutch digital infrastructure inspectorate, is investigating [1][7][9][11]. Neither air traffic control body involved has put out a statement of its own. Their positions reach the public through the press. Readers should weigh them on that basis.

What the record shows

Accounts of the timing vary. Several reports say the interference began around 18:00 and lasted about 20 minutes [1][2]. Data analyst John Wiseman timed it at 18:08 to 18:27 local time [3]. The Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management said seven aircraft reported between 18:15 and 18:30 [11]. Another report gives about 30 minutes [5].

Crew reports describe both receivers failing, not a degraded fix. A KLM crew reported that both GPS systems had failed [1][7]. A SAS crew told the tower they were being jammed [1]. A Lufthansa flight reported a fault on its first GPS system and then on its second. Air France pilots also reported problems [7]. LVNL, the Dutch air navigation service provider, received no spoofing reports. There was no emergency declaration [6].

The approaches that failed were satellite-based Required Navigation Performance (RNP) procedures [2][3][8][10]. The aircraft stayed in contact with air traffic control and landed on backup systems [9]. One report says crews moved to a radio-based navigation system [5]. LVNL reported no flight-safety consequences [3][7]. The ministry said safety was never compromised [4][6].

The count depends on who is counting

The total number of affected aircraft is an analyst estimate. Figures include about 80 [2][3][7][8], about 50 according to GPSwise [9], and at least 28 according to gpsjam.org [5]. The ministry said only that dozens of aircraft lost GPS [6]. Most of the roughly 80 were at cruise altitude, not on approach [2][3]. The spread reflects different data sources and thresholds. It does not mean anyone is wrong.

The affected area is also unsettled. Some reports place it over the Netherlands, Belgium, eastern England and north-west Germany [2][3][7]. LVNL suspects aircraft over Germany or the United Kingdom were also affected [6]. skeyes, the Belgian air navigation service provider, recorded no jamming or spoofing reports that Monday, and no aircraft had to land in Belgium as a result [2][3]. Its spokesperson, Kurt Verwilligen, said more aircraft now arrive unable to fly satellite-based RNP approaches because their systems were disrupted earlier in the flight. Those aircraft must use the ground-based Instrument Landing System (ILS) instead [2][3].

Location is an estimate; attribution is not established

Wiseman reconstructed the event from ADS-B data. He placed a possible source in the North Sea, roughly 80–110 nautical miles (148–204 km) north of Texel. The estimated altitude was consistent with a transmitter near sea level, such as a ship. He cautioned that the location is uncertain [3][8][10]. A separate analysis by Hexbird gives 150–200 km north of Texel [9].

Six Russian-flagged vessels were in the wider area [1][2][3][9][10]. Three of them were a military cargo convoy that left Baltiysk on 5 November under corvette escort [3][12]. The Maritime Executive’s convoy report does not mention GPS interference [12]. No authority has linked any vessel to the event. LVNL called deliberate jamming plausible, but said it was not established [2][9].

Named experts have offered views, and they are views. Peter Wijninga of HCSS said the event fits a hybrid pattern of sowing confusion. He also said RDI will probably be unable to pinpoint the cause [1][4]. Joris Melkert of TU Delft called such jamming common on NATO’s eastern flank but highly exceptional in the Netherlands [4].

This was the second such event affecting Dutch airspace in 2026. The first was in July, between the United Kingdom and the Netherlands [2][10]. One report puts the July count at 58 aircraft [9]. In June 2025 the ministry told parliament that monitoring at four Dutch sites had recorded 77 GNSS disruptions over about three weeks per site. Twenty-three of them were strong enough to potentially affect nearby GNSS-dependent functions [17].

The eastern flank is the baseline

On 3 November, six days before the Schiphol event, maps based on AirNav Radar data showed degraded navigation accuracy across almost the whole NATO eastern flank. The heaviest areas were around Kaliningrad, Lithuania, eastern Poland, Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria and the western Black Sea [13][14]. Such maps show where accuracy fell. They cannot locate transmitters [14]. No state has claimed responsibility. Some of the interference may come from NATO members’ own counter-drone systems [14]. Lithuania’s regulator recorded 302 pilot reports between January and early March 2026, after a record 1,022 in June 2025 [15]. No source links the 3 November pattern to the North Sea event.

What carried the landings

The operational lesson is that ground infrastructure did the work. EASA Safety Information Bulletin 2022-02R4, issued on 3 July 2026, tells air navigation service providers to keep ILS, DME and VOR operational and to hold contingency plans for jamming and spoofing. It tells operators to train crews, keep non-GNSS procedures available and cross-check position by non-GNSS means [16]. No Dutch flight information region appears in the bulletin’s most-affected tables [16]. That is a reminder that those tables lag the threat.

For Asia-Pacific the parallel is direct. At the ICAO Asia-Pacific Directors General conference in Kuala Lumpur in September 2026, IATA called GNSS interference a persistent and growing risk. It named military entities as the most significant originators of deliberate interference. It also called for a minimum operating network of ground-based backup navigation aids [18]. The Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia (CAAM) told an ICAO symposium that it runs GNSS monitoring at Penang and KLIA and keeps DVOR/DME and ILS as backups. It said the primary obstacle to mitigation is delayed reporting [19]. CAAM’s reported figures rise from 91 reports in 2023 to 927 in 2024. Most of them came from overseas flight information regions, not Malaysian airspace [19].

What to do

  • Air navigation service providers: treat ILS and DME/DME coverage as safety-critical backup, not legacy cost. Plan runway-by-runway reversion for when RNP is unavailable to arriving traffic [2][16].
  • Operators: brief dual-receiver GNSS loss as a realistic case on approach to any major hub, not only in published hotspots, and report every event promptly [16][19].
  • Regulators: shorten the gap between a crew report and public notice. Here the gap was six days, and the public detail came from press and hobbyist ADS-B analysis, not from the authorities [3][11].
  • Analysts: report ADS-B-derived counts with their source and threshold. On one evening, three credible tools gave 28, 50 and 80 [3][5][9].

The Schiphol event ended safely because a non-satellite layer was still there to fall back on. Jamming is spreading beyond the regions where it used to be expected. Electronic intelligence work now has to include the ordinary job of keeping that fallback in place, and of counting interference events consistently.

Sources

Every R3KONX article cites its primary material. 19 sources, in order of first citation. Links open the original publication.

  1. Dozens of planes lose GPS near Schiphol in jamming attack DutchNews.nl · 2026-11-16
  2. GPS signals from dozens of aircraft over Belgium and the Netherlands disrupted VRT NWS · 2026-11-16
  3. Suspected GPS jamming affects 80 aircraft, disrupts Schiphol approaches AeroTime · 2026-11-16
  4. GPS jamming around Schiphol another sign of Russia ramping up hybrid war, experts think NL Times · 2026-11-16
  5. At least seven Schiphol-bound flights disrupted by GPS interference NL Times · 2026-11-15
  6. GPS-jamming bij Schiphol: wat is er precies gebeurd? NH Nieuws · 2026-11-16
  7. Lufthansa, KLM und Air France melden beim Anflug auf Amsterdam GPS-Probleme aeroTELEGRAPH · 2026-11-16
  8. Suspected GPS Jamming Over The Netherlands Affects Dozens of Aircraft GPS World · 2026-11-16
  9. GPS disruption affects dozens of aircraft over the Netherlands IO+ · 2026-11-16
  10. GPS-signaal vliegtuigen verstoord boven Noordzee, Russische schepen in de buurt Hart van Nederland / ANP · 2026-11-15
  11. Kees ontdekt grote GPS-blackout vliegverkeer Hart van Nederland · 2026-11-15
  12. Second military cargo convoy casts off from Kaliningrad The Maritime Executive · 2026-11-11
  13. From the Baltic to the Black Sea: large-scale GPS jamming detected along NATO borders Militarnyi · 2026-11-04
  14. Des perturbations GPS à grande échelle le long de la frontière orientale de l'OTAN Business AM · 2026-11-04
  15. GPS jamming incidents reported by pilots continue in Lithuania, regulator says LRT English / BNS · 2026-03-09
  16. Global Navigation Satellite System Outages and Alterations, SIB 2022-02R4 European Union Aviation Safety Agency · 2026-07-03
  17. Ruimtevaartbeleid; Brief regering; Vervolg op IKUS II (Kamerstuk 24446 nr. 92) Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Waterstaat · 2025-06-03
  18. GNSS Radio Frequency Interference (RFI), DGCA-61/IP/04/08 IATA, ICAO Asia/Pacific DGCA conference · 2026-09
  19. Addressing GNSS RFI in Malaysia: Challenges, Impact and Mitigation Strategies Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia, ICAO APAC Radio Navigation Symposium · 2025

Researched and written by the R3KONX Analysis Desk from the cited primary material. No Dutch or Belgian authority has published its own account; official positions are reported as relayed by the cited media, and aircraft counts and source-location estimates come from independent analysis of public ADS-B data. Corrections: event@r3konx.asia.

R3KONX 2027

Work in this domain? So does the programme

4–6 May 2027, World Trade Centre Kuala Lumpur. Curated talks, hands-on training and The BattleGrid.