US counter-drone pact puts the FAA between jammers and civil airspace
A five-department memorandum signed off on 9 November routes federal counter-drone systems through FAA and FCC review. The evidence for why is a fatal crash under scheduled GPS jamming, a seven-hour airport closure and a rapidly growing pool of authorised operators.
The finding
The United States has moved counter-drone electronic attack inside a formal civil aviation safety process. On 9 November the FAA announced a memorandum of understanding between the Departments of Transportation, War, Homeland Security, Energy and Justice, led by the White House Task Force to Restore American Airspace Sovereignty [1]. Agencies that build or field systems to detect, track, stop or take control of drones must now work with the FAA and the FCC, share requirements and test data, and accept FAA safety reviews [1]. Where risk is not reduced enough, the FAA can impose its own measures, including airspace restrictions [1].
The memorandum does not add money or legal authority, and it names no approved systems or deployment timetable [2]. Its practical effect is speed with conditions. An FAA official told Reuters that reviews of systems already evaluated could take as little as 24 hours [2]. The memorandum text has not been published; the FAA release and secondary reporting are the only public record.
Why the FAA wanted a seat
Three incidents this year show what happens when emitters and kinetic effectors run near civil traffic without tight coordination.
The first is fatal. On the night of 14 May a Beechcraft King Air air ambulance struck the Capitan Mountains near Ruidoso, New Mexico, at about 10,000 feet, killing all four on board [4]. According to KOB 4’s account of the NTSB preliminary report, the crew lost GPS just after leaving Roswell and told Albuquerque controllers, who asked White Sands Missile Range to stop jamming [4]. Jamming resumed at 12:10 a.m.; the impact came about five minutes later [4]. Three other aircraft in the same airspace reported losing GPS [4]. The crew’s preflight briefing included the range’s warning of scheduled jamming for that time and place [4]. The weather reporting system at the destination was out of service, so no approved instrument approach was available [4]. The report notes a roughly 600-foot difference between two systems tracking the aircraft’s height, and investigators have not determined whether the jamming caused it [4]. No probable cause has been issued [3].
The sources differ on timing. KOB 4 reported the preliminary report’s release in June [4]. DefenseScoop describes it as issued in August [3]. A congressional press release dated 5 August already discusses its findings, which is consistent with the earlier date [5]. That release sought a joint DOT and DoD briefing on test notification procedures, controller training and coordination during testing [5].
The second incident is operational disruption. On 11 February the FAA issued a temporary flight restriction over El Paso for 10 nautical miles, from the surface to 17,999 feet, citing special security reasons and planned to run for ten days [6]. It was lifted after 7 hours and 24 minutes; Flightradar24 counted 19% of El Paso traffic that day as cancelled [6]. DroneLife reports that a laser counter-drone system had been used without a completed FAA safety review [2].
The third is scale. Northern Command used a jamming-equipped Flyaway Kit against several incursions at an unnamed base after Operation Epic Fury began on 28 February, and said it had not determined nefarious intent [14]. In September the command ran counter-drone experiments at Yuma Proving Ground and said its next exercise would be in an urban area, where structures and congestion add complexity [15].
What the rules now say
The memorandum sits on top of a regime that already constrains state and local users. The DOJ and DHS interim final rule under the SAFER SKIES Act, published on 6 July, requires agencies to notify air traffic control within five minutes of a mitigation activation, or as soon as operationally practicable, and to confirm when it ends [8]. The rule describes airspace coordination as coordination, not approval [8]. It states that an agency must obtain FCC authorisation before operating a system that emits radio waves [8]. Each RF-emitting system on the Authorized Systems List must first pass a system-level spectrum evaluation [8]. The initial technology list is expected to cover RF detection with command-and-control interception, RF disruption and RF protocol manipulation [8].
The FCC gave those agencies a nationwide 180-day special temporary authority from 2 July for listed systems [9]. By our arithmetic that runs to late December 2026 unless replaced. Mitigation requires a two-week residential course; the departments expect about 1,500 agencies at the detection tier and 150 at the mitigation tier within two years [10]. Violations can bring civil fines of up to $100,000 [10]. Mitigation also requires notice to the FBI at least 30 days in advance and a post-operation report within 48 hours [11].
Money is following. FEMA’s FY2027 counter-UAS grant offers $250 million, with applications closing on 16 November [12]. Mitigation equipment must be on the authorised lists, and recipients must share detection data with DHS [12]. Purchasing authority does not equal operating authority [12].
What it means
Electronic attack against drones is spreading from test ranges to cities, borders, prisons and critical infrastructure. Each jammer is a potential source of interference for receivers that are not its target. Lisa Dyer, executive director of the GPS Innovation Alliance, warned that tests can affect civilians with or without NOTAMs and recommended a larger test range than White Sands [3]. She also cited more than 6,000 correctional facilities, many near transport hubs, as the FCC weighs jamming near prisons [3].
The new process is strongest for federal systems going through FAA review. It says less about cumulative effects when many authorised emitters operate close together. The interim rule’s visible text addresses interference to aircraft communications; it does not discuss GNSS [8]. The April FAA assessment of a laser system was published as a conclusion, finding no undue risk to passenger aircraft, without the underlying data [7].
What to do
- Flight operations: treat government GNSS interference as a scheduled hazard. The FAA guide says to check NOTAMs and FAA public notices for the route, plan ground-based NAVAID alternatives and brief effects on TAWS, ADS-B and CPDLC [13].
- In flight: when interference is suspected, the FAA guide advises deselecting GNSS, inhibiting hybrid updating and TAWS enhanced mode, navigating on ground-based aids and notifying ATC [13]. Spoofing can disable TAWS look-ahead and produce false alerts that persist into the approach [13].
- Report every event through the FAA GPS anomaly process with aircraft, time, position, phase of flight and receiver details [13].
- Public safety agencies: do not operate RF-emitting equipment bought with grant money until FCC authority, list status and FBI certification are confirmed [8][12]. Track the special temporary authority’s expiry [9].
- Critical infrastructure and airports: ask federal partners which systems are approved near your site and how ATC will be told when they activate [1][8].
Spectrum close
For practitioners in Malaysia and the wider region, the lesson is structural rather than local. Counter-drone authority is now delegated well beyond the military, and every grant of authority adds emitters to shared spectrum. The US answer is to put the aviation regulator and the spectrum regulator in the approval chain [1][9]. Whether that prevents a repeat of Ruidoso depends on data the public has not yet seen: the NTSB’s final findings and the spectrum evaluations behind each listed system.
Sources
Every R3KONX article cites its primary material. 15 sources, in order of first citation. Links open the original publication.
- Trump Administration Deepens Interagency Collaboration to Protect Nation's Skies from Unmanned Aircraft Threats Federal Aviation Administration · 2026-11-09
- Federal Agreement Could Cut Counter-Drone Reviews to 24 Hours DroneLife · 2026-11-09
- Director of GPS Innovation Alliance warns of risks to civilians from military testing of jamming and spoofing technologies DefenseScoop · 2026-11-06
- NTSB: GPS jamming was active when air ambulance crew flew into Capitan Mountains KOB 4 · 2026-06-18
- Rep. Vasquez demands DOT and DoD briefing following preliminary report on deadly crash Office of Rep. Gabe Vasquez, US House of Representatives · 2026-08-05
- FAA closes El Paso airspace Flightradar24 · 2026-02-11
- FAA and DOW Sign Landmark Safety Agreement to Protect Southern Border Federal Aviation Administration · 2026-04-10
- Counter-UAS Authority for State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Law Enforcement and Correctional Agencies (interim final rule, 91 FR 41466) Federal Register / US Government Publishing Office · 2026-07-06
- Counter-UAS Spectrum Authority for State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Law Enforcement and Correctional Agencies under the SAFER SKIES Act (DA 26-656) Federal Communications Commission · 2026-07-02
- New Federal Counter-Drone Rule Gives Local Police and Corrections Agencies Authority to Detect, Disable Dangerous Drones Homeland Security Today · 2026-07
- DOJ and DHS issue interim final rule on state and local counter-drone authority under the SAFER SKIES Act Crowell & Moring · 2026-07
- Counter-UAS funding goes nationwide: Key takeaways from FEMA's FY 2027 C-UAS Grant Program Hogan Lovells Cadwalader · 2026-11-04
- GPS/GNSS Interference Resource Guide, version 1.1 Federal Aviation Administration · 2026-03-12
- U.S. military reveals more details about drone incursions at strategic base DefenseScoop · 2026-03-24
- Northcom’s next counter-drone demo will be its first in an urban area DefenseScoop · 2026-09-25
Researched and written by the R3KONX Analysis Desk from the cited primary material. The National Transportation Safety Board preliminary report and the Reuters report on review times could not be retrieved directly; their contents are cited through KOB 4, DefenseScoop and DroneLife, and the memorandum text itself has not been published. Corrections: event@r3konx.asia.
