ELINT · Electronic Intelligence

GNSS jamming is now measured from orbit, and the South-East Asia figures are still missing

DTU Space's SAT-JAM map and AMOS 2026 paper use open Sentinel, Swarm and Spire receiver data to show jammed areas over Europe more than tripling since 2023. The team says the map also shows South-East Asia, but has published no regional numbers.

Satellites in low Earth orbit are now recording the same GNSS interference that has degraded aviation and shipping over Europe, and a DTU Space team has published the measurements as a free public map. The SAT-JAM tool and its accompanying AMOS 2026 paper show the number of jammed grid cells seen from orbit more than tripling between 2023 and 2026, with GPS, Galileo, GLONASS and BeiDou all affected [1][2]. The DTU release says the map also shows interference over South-East Asia. No figures for that region have been published [1][2][3].

What the measurements show

The paper, “Characterization of GNSS Interference in LEO over Europe”, was presented at the AMOS conference in Maui, held 15–18 September [2][6]. It uses openly released precise orbit determination and radio occultation records from ESA, EUMETSAT, NASA and UCAR, covering 2021 to May 2026 [2]. The spacecraft include Swarm A and B, Sentinel-1A and -1C, Sentinel-2C, Sentinel-3A, Sentinel-6 and Spire’s LEMUR-2 cubesats, at altitudes from about 400 km to 1,336 km [2].

The indicator is carrier-to-noise density. A drop of more than 3 dB-Hz below an unaffected baseline is classed as jammed [2]. Counting hexagonal grid cells that meet the test on Swarm A, the authors report 530 jammed cells in 2023 and 1,779 in 2026 [2]. The 2026 figure covers data only to May. The authors place the interference centre near 36°E, 51°N, in western Russia close to the Ukrainian border, and say the pattern fits a ground-based source [2][3].

Legacy GPS W-code tracking on L1 and L2 shows the largest drops [2]. Cycle slips rose inside the affected area, and Spire radio occultation coverage thinned, with some areas returning no measurements at all [2]. Using Sentinel-1A data and an assumed GPS transmit power, the authors estimate the interference at roughly 383 kW EIRP. They describe this as an order-of-magnitude figure, not a measurement [2].

The study does not address spoofing. It also works from processed receiver outputs, not raw intermediate-frequency samples, so it cannot characterise the interfering waveforms [2].

How the map works and where sources differ

SAT-JAM draws on Copernicus Sentinel-1, -2 and -3 receiver data in RINEX format. The pipeline runs nightly, with a data lag of one to three weeks [3]. The site flags an observation when its carrier-to-noise z-score falls below −1 and colours hexagons about 300 km across by the fraction flagged [3]. That differs from the fixed 3 dB-Hz threshold in the paper, so map values and paper counts are not directly comparable [2][3].

Two details differ between sources. The SAT-JAM site describes a rolling averaging window of about six weeks, while a Danish space newsletter reports 40 days [3][5]. The DTU release describes affected satellites at 400–600 km, while the paper’s dataset extends to Sentinel-6 at 1,336 km [1][2].

The site warns that a red cell shows where the satellite was, not where the emitter is. It does not mean GNSS is jammed on the ground beneath it [3]. The lead author, Kian Bostani Nezhad, repeated that caveat in an interview published by Splash on 26 October [4]. SAT-JAM is most sensitive to jamming and may not detect spoofing [3].

Orbit-based monitoring is not new. A University of Texas-led team used a software receiver on the International Space Station from 2017 to locate a Syrian emitter to within about 220 m at 95% confidence, and recorded persistent L2 interference over mainland China [7][8]. A March 2026 Chungbuk National University paper used CYGNSS reflectometry noise floors to flag interference over the Middle East in 62% of epochs [9]. What is new is a continuously updated public product built from operational Earth observation spacecraft.

Why it matters

Sentinel precise orbits reach about 1 cm, and that accuracy underpins altimetry and payload products [10]. DTU says the team has seen spacecraft temporarily lose accurate position information over Europe, and notes that some communication satellites need GNSS to point their antennas [1]. Radio occultation profiles, which feed weather forecasting, were less available inside the affected area [1][2]. Bostani Nezhad’s view that “it is actually surprisingly easy to jam a satellite” reflects the unobstructed path from a ground source to orbit [1].

Ground data point the same way. Poland’s National Institute of Telecommunications reported partial interference on 48% of 2026 days at its Gdańsk station, and full-band interference on 63% of days from 1 to 19 August [11]. On 19 October Poland, Estonia, Finland and Latvia asked the EU Council to treat GPS interference as a possible force majeure ground for farmers under the 2028–2034 agricultural policy, according to a report of RMF24’s coverage [12].

Industry announcements in the past week follow the same assumption. Safran said on 20 October that its SkyNaute inertial system, built around hemispherical resonator gyroscopes, will equip the Airbus A220, its first airliner application, to hold track when GNSS is jammed or spoofed [13]. Trade press reports entry into service around 2030; Safran’s release gives no date [13][14]. On 21 October Raytheon UK announced contracts from Sweden’s FMV for Landshield and Landshield Plus anti-jam antenna systems [15].

What to do

  • Satellite operators: compare your own receiver telemetry (carrier-to-noise density, cycle slips, tracked-satellite counts) against SAT-JAM over the European area of interest, and share anomalies with researchers [2][3].
  • Earth observation users: check orbit-quality flags for passes over affected regions before relying on geolocation in intelligence, mapping or emergency products [2][10].
  • Mission designers: do not assume semi-codeless GPS W-code tracking stays available for dual-frequency orbit determination; plan for modern civil signals and multi-constellation tracking [2].
  • Treat SAT-JAM as a research indicator, not a safety source. It locates the observer, not the emitter, and is weak on spoofing [3].
  • Aviation and maritime operators: apply EASA SIB 2022-02R4 procedures and phraseology, train crews for GNSS-free navigation, and assess controlled reception pattern antennas and inertial fallbacks [4][16][17].
  • APAC operators and regulators: ask DTU for the regional data behind its South-East Asia statement before drawing conclusions [1][3].

The electronic intelligence view

Every GNSS-equipped spacecraft is an incidental L-band sensor, and its receiver logs record terrestrial emitters on each pass. DTU has shown that open archives are enough to estimate a source region and an order-of-magnitude power. The same method could be applied to South-East Asia with data already in public archives. Until those numbers are published, claims about interference in this region as seen from orbit should be read as qualitative.

Sources

Every R3KONX article cites its primary material. 17 sources, in order of first citation. Links open the original publication.

  1. GPS jamming over Europe is also disrupting satellites in space DTU Space · 2026-10-13
  2. Characterization of GNSS Interference in LEO over Europe (AMOS 2026) Technical University of Denmark / AMOS Conference · 2026-09-15
  3. SAT-JAM: GNSS interference map from Earth observation satellites DTU Space (K. Bostani Nezhad) · 2026-10-27
  4. SAT-JAM: Ships must learn to navigate without GPS Splash247 · 2026-10-26
  5. Issue #20: Something's got to change Danish Space News · 2026-10-14
  6. AMOS 2026, 15–18 September 2026, Maui, Hawaii SpacePolicyOnline · 2026-09-15
  7. First results from three years of GNSS interference monitoring from low Earth orbit arXiv (Murrian et al.) · 2020-09-09
  8. Characterizing GNSS interference from low-Earth orbit Inside GNSS · 2020-02-03
  9. Detection of GNSS interference using reflected signal observations from the LEO satellite constellation arXiv (Shin and Son, Chungbuk National University) · 2026-03-05
  10. In depth: Sentinel POD ESA Navigation Office · 2026-10-27
  11. GNSS jamming intensifies along Poland's Baltic coast, institute reports Inside GNSS · 2026-08-27
  12. Poland and three EU countries want GPS interference considered in force majeure rules UA.News (citing RMF24) · 2026-10-26
  13. Safran SkyNaute inertial navigation system will equip the Airbus A220 Safran · 2026-10-20
  14. Airbus to fight GPS jamming with military tech on A220 jets Aerospace Global News · 2026-10-26
  15. Raytheon UK to strengthen NATO navigation resilience with GPS anti-jamming technology RTX · 2026-10-21
  16. EASA updates Safety Information Bulletin on GNSS interference EASA · 2026-07-03
  17. EASA and EUROCONTROL publish joint Action Plan to ensure safe operations during GNSS interference events EASA · 2026-03-26

Researched and written by the R3KONX analysis desk from the cited primary material. The SAT-JAM map is interactive and was read from its methodology page, not its live map layers; the South-East Asia observation rests on the DTU release alone. The EU farm force majeure proposal is cited from a secondary report of RMF24 coverage because the original could not be located. Corrections to event@r3konx.asia.

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