ELINT · Electronic Intelligence

Thirty nanoseconds for twelve hours: Dstl puts numbers on resilient timing

A UK defence market-engagement notice defines resilient PNT as measurable timing, position and holdover performance under jamming and spoofing. Recent US accident evidence shows why civil and critical-infrastructure operators should adopt the same discipline.

The UK Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) has published a request for information that defines resilient positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) in measurable terms. It asks for a system that keeps time to better than ±30 ns of UTC and position to better than 5 m through a continuous 12-hour loss of every external PNT source, while under GNSS jamming and spoofing [1]. That is a more useful definition than most procurement language in this field. Operators outside defence should borrow it.

What the notice asks for

The notice, reference SP4RFI, was published on 11 November 2026 and amended on 12 November. Responses are due by 17:00 on 9 December 2026 [1]. It is a preliminary market engagement notice under the Procurement Act 2023. Dstl states it may not proceed to procurement [1][2].

  • Timing: a 1PPS output traceable to UTC and a 10 MHz reference, both better than ±30 ns of UTC in normal operation and in holdover [1][2].
  • Position: a static solution better than 5 m against surveyed ground truth [1].
  • Holdover: both requirements maintained through 12 hours without any external PNT source [1][2].
  • Threat conditions: continued performance under jamming and spoofing, initial acquisition under jamming and spoofing, and demonstrated resilience of any non-GNSS source such as LEO-PNT [1][2].
  • Maturity: TRL 9 or equivalent evidence of operational deployment [1].

The exclusions matter as much as the requirements. Solutions may not rely on fixed local infrastructure such as fibre timing distribution, on user-generated PNT signals, on temporary reference sources, or on ITAR-controlled components [1][2]. Respondents must disclose antenna siting, sky-visibility and infrastructure dependencies, and must state oscillator technology, size, weight and power, and indicative unit cost [1][2]. The notice gives an estimated value of £100,000 excluding VAT and a contract window of February to March 2027 [1]. That scale points to evaluation units, not a fleet buy.

Why the numbers are hard

The holdover clause is the demanding one. If a clock drifts at a constant fractional frequency offset, accumulated time error is that offset multiplied by elapsed time. Staying inside 30 ns over 43,200 seconds therefore requires an average offset of roughly 7 × 10⁻¹³ or better, before any allowance for initial error or temperature. That figure is R3KONX arithmetic from the published requirement, not a Dstl statement. It explains why the notice asks for oscillator technology and evidenced holdover performance rather than datasheet claims [1].

The global-operation requirement and the ban on local infrastructure also narrow the field. The UK is funding national alternatives. In November 2025 the government committed £155m to PNT resilience, including £71m for a national eLoran system, £68m for the National Timing Centre, £13m for GNSS interference monitoring and £3m for space-based time transfer [9]. In May 2026 the Ministry of Defence awarded a £6m contract to a QinetiQ-led team under the two-year Urgent Compass programme, aiming for a deployable eLoran system by April 2028 [10]. Those systems serve the UK and deployed users within coverage. A requirement for global operation implies a different architecture: protected GNSS reception, sensor fusion, high-stability holdover and, where available, independent signals such as LEO-PNT [1]. ESA launched the first two Celeste demonstration satellites in March 2026 to begin testing a low Earth orbit layer complementary to Galileo [13]. Dstl has separately run unattended trials of next-generation atomic clock components and devices, and states a goal of flying quantum navigation systems, including atomic clocks, on an aircraft by 2030 [12].

Marketing language should be treated with care. The MoD release described eLoran as jamming-proof [10]. The Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation, which supports eLoran, said that headline overstated the case because any radio signal can be jammed [11]. Dstl’s notice avoids the adjective and asks for evidence instead [1].

Interference is not confined to conflict zones

The case for measurable resilience is no longer theoretical for civil operators. On 14 May 2026 a Beech C90 air ambulance struck terrain near the Capitan Mountains, New Mexico, killing all four occupants [4]. The NTSB preliminary report states that GPS jamming encompassing the area was being conducted by the US military during the flight. The crew reported loss of GPS shortly after departure, and three other aircraft also reported GPS loss to the en-route centre [4]. The report records the controller’s supervisor asking the military to stop jamming at about 0001 and again at about 0005, and telling it at about 0010 that jamming could resume because the aircraft was on a visual approach [4]. A NOTAM for the White Sands test warned that GPS, including WAAS, GBAS and ADS-B, might be unavailable within a 366 NM radius [4]. The report is preliminary and states no probable cause [4][5].

The GPS Innovation Alliance has since argued that US government testing is affecting civil users beyond test ranges and has called for better coordination [3]. The Army told DefenseScoop it could not comment while the investigation continues [3]. A US interagency aviation bulletin from the Department of the Interior and the USDA Forest Service now tells crews to make GPS interference NOTAM checks part of normal preflight activity, and notes that ATC can request that testing be stopped for safety-of-life missions [6].

Elsewhere, interference is an operating condition. EASA issued revision 4 of its GNSS interference Safety Information Bulletin on 3 July 2026, adding pilot-ATC phraseology, electronic flight bag integration and new training requirements [7]. Offshore, UTEC and Sonardyne are fielding acoustic-inertial positioning for more than 150 km of shallow-water pipelay in the Middle East because, in UTEC’s words, interference, denial and spoofing are becoming operational realities in some regions [8].

What practitioners should do

  • Specify holdover numerically. State the maximum time error and position error tolerated over a defined outage, as Dstl does, instead of asking for a resilient or anti-jam product [1].
  • Demand evidence under threat. Require measured performance under jamming and spoofing, including cold-start acquisition, not only under clear-sky conditions [1].
  • Map equipment to a framework. The DHS Resilient PNT Conformance Framework defines cumulative levels from full recovery (Level 1) to operating through compromise without degradation using diverse sources (Level 4) [14]. IEEE P1952 is developing a user-equipment standard built on resilience levels [15].
  • Audit dependencies. Record antenna siting, sky visibility, fibre or network timing paths and export-control constraints for every timing source, as the RFI requires respondents to do [1].
  • Treat NOTAMs and interference notices as operational inputs for aviation, drone and survey work, and report anomalies so sources can be identified [6][7].
  • Plan for national alternatives without depending on them. eLoran and national timing infrastructure add diversity within coverage, on published timelines [9][10].

The spectrum view

For the electromagnetic operations community, the Dstl notice is a statement of the threat model the UK expects to work through: jamming and spoofing on initial acquisition as well as in steady state, and half a day with no external reference at all [1]. The New Mexico investigation shows the same threat can be generated by friendly testing inside a controlled national airspace [4]. Resilience that is not specified in nanoseconds, metres and hours cannot be tested, and resilience that cannot be tested should not be assumed.

Sources

Every R3KONX article cites its primary material. 15 sources, in order of first citation. Links open the original publication.

  1. Request For Information: Resilient Timing and Positioning System for Operation in Degraded GNSS Environments (2026/S 000-107427) Defence Science and Technology Laboratory / Find a Tender · 2026-11-11
  2. U.K. Tender on Resilient PNT GPS World · 2026-11-12
  3. Director of GPS Innovation Alliance warns of risks to civilians from military testing of jamming and spoofing technologies DefenseScoop · 2026-11-06
  4. Aviation Investigation Preliminary Report WPR26FA186 (Beech C90, N249CP) National Transportation Safety Board · 2026-06-19
  5. NTSB: GPS Jamming Active Before C90 Accident AVweb · 2026-06-19
  6. Interagency Aviation Accident Prevention Bulletin IA APB 26-07: GPS Interference Testing US Department of the Interior and USDA Forest Service · 2026-07-17
  7. EASA updates Safety Information Bulletin on GNSS interference European Union Aviation Safety Agency · 2026-07-03
  8. UTEC-Sonardyne develop layered defence for GNSS-challenged pipelay projects Sonardyne · 2026-11-02
  9. Landmark government investment to safeguard the essential signals we all rely on GOV.UK (DSIT) · 2025-11-19
  10. UK Armed Forces better protected with new jamming-proof navigation tech GOV.UK (Ministry of Defence) · 2026-05-06
  11. UK Armed Forces better protected with new jamming-proof navigation tech (with RNTF commentary) Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation · 2026-05-06
  12. Trial speeds up next generation of atomic clocks GOV.UK (Dstl) · 2026-02-18
  13. Celeste's first satellites launched to explore LEO-based satellite navigation European Space Agency · 2026-03-28
  14. Resilient Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Conformance Framework, Version 1.0 US Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate · 2020-12-01
  15. IEEE PNT Standard (P1952) Institute of Navigation · 2021-11-18

Researched and written by the R3KONX Analysis Desk from the primary material cited below. The Dstl notice is a request for information, not a contract award; the frequency-stability figure in the analysis section is R3KONX arithmetic derived from the published requirement, not a Dstl statement. The NTSB report cited is preliminary and states no probable cause. Corrections: event@r3konx.asia.

R3KONX 2027

Work in this domain? So does the programme

4–6 May 2027, World Trade Centre Kuala Lumpur. Curated talks, hands-on training and The BattleGrid.