ELINT · Electronic Intelligence

North Sea GPS jamming reaches Schiphol approaches, and public maps miss the source

A 19-minute interference burst on 9 November degraded GNSS for dozens of aircraft over the Low Countries. Counts differ by method, the emitter is unlocated, and attribution to a passing Russian convoy remains unproven.

A 19-minute burst over the southern North Sea

On the evening of 9 November 2026, GNSS reception failed for dozens of aircraft over the Netherlands, Belgium, eastern England and north-west Germany. The window ran from about 17:08Z to 17:27Z, or 18:08 to 18:27 local time [1][2]. Seven aircraft inbound to Amsterdam Schiphol reported navigation problems on approach. All seven landed safely with controller assistance [2][4]. Dutch air traffic control (LVNL) told reporters that deliberate jamming was a plausible explanation and that approaches flown to Required Navigation Performance (RNP) were disrupted [2][5]. The case is now with the Dutch Authority for Digital Infrastructure (RDI), which is investigating. No cause has been published [4][5].

The finding that matters is not the attribution. It is that a short, strong interference event reached one of Europe’s busiest terminal areas, well west of the Baltic and Black Sea zones where such events are routine. The public tools that most practitioners rely on also struggled to see it.

What the data says

The most detailed public reconstruction comes from John Wiseman, who runs the GPSJAM map. He used ADS-B traces and snapshots taken roughly every 15 seconds, compared affected aircraft against a group with healthy GPS, and fitted a propagation model for a sea-level transmitter [1]. His best fit is 54.65N 5.05E, roughly 80 to 110 nautical miles north of Texel. He rates his confidence in that position as low. The stated 95% region reflects model noise, not a 95% probability that a transmitter sat there [1]. Each small change in the assumed jamming reach moves the estimate by 5 to 9 nautical miles. Weaker effects to the north-east are consistent with, but do not prove, a directional emitter. A search of NOTAM and maritime-warning archives found no matching notice [1].

Counts of affected aircraft differ by method, and we publish all of them:

  • About 80 aircraft, according to Wiseman’s reconstruction and data experts cited by VRT NWS [1][3].
  • About 50 aircraft, according to a GPSwise count reported by IO+ and Tech Times [5][7].
  • At least 28 aircraft on 9 November, a figure NL Times attributes to gpsjam.org [6]. Wiseman, however, says the GPSJAM daily map for that date stayed green, because a 19-minute burst is diluted across a 24-hour average [1]. We could not reconcile the two statements.

Not every air navigation service provider saw the event. Belgium’s skeyes reviewed its reports and found no jamming or spoofing logged on 9 November. Its spokesperson added that more aircraft now arrive unable to fly satellite-based approaches because their navigation was degraded earlier in the flight, and must switch to the Instrument Landing System (ILS) [3]. Crew accounts relayed by Dutch media include a KLM crew reporting that both GPS systems had failed and an SAS crew telling the tower they had been jammed [4].

The event is not isolated. Wiseman identifies a similar but separate event on 23 July 2026, about 150 nautical miles away, also without a matching notice [1]. IO+ reports that the July event affected 58 aircraft [5], and Tech Times puts its duration at about 18 minutes over the North Sea [7].

The convoy question

Six Russian-flagged vessels were in the wider area at the time [3][4]. Three of them, Lady R, Lady D and Maia-1, left Baltiysk on 5 November as a group escorted by the corvette Stoikiy, according to The Maritime Executive. A French warship escorted the three-ship group out of the western English Channel on 11 November [8]. Wiseman notes that Sentinel-1 radar imagery shows three vessels near his fitted position, that he made the estimate after the convoy was reported, and that the data cannot establish the source’s identity or purpose [1].

Reporting on the vessels’ sanctions status diverges. VRT NWS states that all three ships and their owner are on the EU sanctions list [3]. The Danish Maritime Authority’s register of EU-designated vessels lists Lady R (IMO 9161003) and Maia-1 (IMO 9358010) from 25 June 2024 [9]. We did not find Lady D (IMO 9349289) in that register. Tech Times notes the same discrepancy between outlets [7]. No public source shows that any of the vessels transmitted [4][7]. Until RDI or another authority reports, attribution remains open.

What it means

Three points follow for practitioners. First, crowd-sourced ADS-B maps are a lead, not a locator. GPSJAM aggregates NACp-based accuracy reports over 24 hours into hexagons and colours a cell red only when more than 10% of aircraft report low accuracy [10]. Its own FAQ says the data does not explain what causes the low accuracy [10]. A red cell marks where receivers suffered, not where an emitter sits. GPSPATRON’s chief executive told Tech Times that aircraft-based monitoring “detects only strong interference” [7]. Weaker, local jammers will be missed. Fixing an emitter generally needs ground receivers using direction finding or time difference of arrival [7].

Second, the North Sea is not yet in the regulatory picture. EASA’s GNSS outages page names the Mediterranean, Black Sea, Middle East, Baltic Sea and Arctic as sensitive areas, and its seven-day FIR table at the 14 October 2026 snapshot did not include Amsterdam [13]. That will matter for flight planning assumptions if events recur.

Third, terminal areas built around satellite approaches carry concentrated exposure. LVNL introduced GPS-based landings at Schiphol in 2021 and said then that it planned to switch off five of its nine ground navigation beacons, retaining beacons at Schiphol, Rotterdam, Eelde and Maastricht as backup [16]. We have not verified how many have since been decommissioned. Exposure among Dutch crews was already rising: spoofing reports from Dutch pilots grew from 163 in 2023 to 1,318 in 2024, according to figures from the national occurrence analysis bureau obtained by NH Nieuws [17]. For comparison, Poland’s National Institute of Telecommunications recorded multi-hour, all-band interference at Gdańsk on about 70% of days in May and June 2026 [15].

What to do

The controls are already written. EASA’s Safety Information Bulletin 2022-02R4, revised on 3 July 2026, sets them out for each stakeholder group [11][12]:

  • Operators: cross-check position by non-GNSS means, monitor GNSS time against other sources, and avoid dispatching into affected areas with an inoperative GNSS backup. File an AIREP for observed irregularities [11].
  • ANSPs: keep communications and surveillance coverage sufficient for sustained vectoring, retain ILS, DME and VOR, and consider local interference detection [11].
  • States: keep non-GNSS infrastructure operational, issue NOTAMs early, and work with telecommunications regulators against unauthorised transmitters [11].
  • Mariners: the Dutch Safety Improvement Sheet No. 14 advises that GNSS should never be the sole means of navigation and that position be checked against radar, visual and terrestrial methods [18].

For spectrum and security teams, two further steps follow. Log events with UTC timestamps at fine resolution rather than relying on daily aggregates, since a 19-minute burst disappears in a 24-hour map [1][10]. Feed reports into the joint EASA and EUROCONTROL effort to build “a common, validated operational picture of GNSS interference events across Europe” [14].

ELINT close

The 9 November event shows the gap between observing interference and locating an emitter. ADS-B gives wide-area detection from aircraft that are, in effect, distributed sensors. It does not give geolocation good enough for enforcement. That needs calibrated ground or maritime collection, cross-border data sharing and a regulator willing to publish findings. RDI’s investigation is the next data point to watch. Until it reports, the defensible position is the one Wiseman takes: a sea-level source north of Texel is the best fit, and the data does not name it [1].

Sources

Every R3KONX article cites its primary material. 18 sources, in order of first citation. Links open the original publication.

  1. GPS interference over the southern North Sea, 9 November 2026 HEXBIRD (John Wiseman) · 2026-11-13
  2. Suspected GPS jamming affects 80 aircraft, disrupts Schiphol approaches AeroTime · 2026-11-16
  3. GPS-signaal van tientallen vliegtuigen boven België en Nederland verstoord VRT NWS · 2026-11-15
  4. Dozens of planes lose GPS near Schiphol in jamming attack DutchNews.nl · 2026-11-16
  5. GPS disruption affects dozens of aircraft over the Netherlands IO+ · 2026-11-16
  6. Video: At least seven Schiphol-bound flights disrupted by GPS interference NL Times · 2026-11-15
  7. Suspected GPS jamming disrupts 80 aircraft near Schiphol; public maps cannot locate transmitter Tech Times · 2026-11-16
  8. Second military cargo convoy casts off from Kaliningrad The Maritime Executive · 2026-11-11
  9. EU sanction designated vessels Danish Maritime Authority · 2026-07-24
  10. GPSJAM frequently asked questions GPSJAM · 2026-11-16
  11. SIB 2022-02R4: GNSS outage and alterations leading to navigation/surveillance degradation EASA · 2026-07-03
  12. EASA updates Safety Information Bulletin on GNSS interference EASA · 2026-07-03
  13. Global Navigation Satellite System outages and alterations EASA · 2026-10-14
  14. EASA and EUROCONTROL publish joint Action Plan to ensure safe operations during GNSS interference events EASA · 2026-03-25
  15. Polish institute analysis finds drastic increase in GNSS interference, offers guidelines GPS World · 2026-08-26
  16. LVNL switches to GPS navigation Royal Schiphol Group · 2021-08-12
  17. Extreme toename van meldingen over verstoring GPS-signaal in Nederlandse cockpits NH Nieuws · 2025-01-21
  18. Safety Improvement Sheet: disrupted GPS signals RBG Maritime Training & Consultancy · 2026-08-03

Researched and written by the R3KONX Analysis Desk from the primary material cited below. The source-location estimate rests on a single independent ADS-B reconstruction that its author rates as low confidence; official statements from LVNL are reported via the press, NRC's original report could not be retrieved, and no regulator has published a cause. Aircraft counts differ between sources and are presented side by side. Corrections: event@r3konx.asia.

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