ELINT · Electronic Intelligence

Europe is handing drone-jamming powers to infrastructure operators before spectrum coordination is ready

France has legislated, and Austria, Czechia and Poland are drafting, powers for utilities and transport operators to neutralise drones. The French power cannot yet be used, and the radio-interference controls that would govern it were built for state users.

European governments are moving the authority to jam drones out of the state and towards the operators of power grids, airports, railways and fuel depots. France has already legislated. Austria, Czechia and Poland have drafts or announced amendments in motion, and Germany is reviewing the question [1][9][11][13]. The policy debate is framed around shoot-downs and liability. The harder engineering problem is spectrum: a jammer fielded by a utility is an intentional emitter operated next to its own control links, its neighbours’ mobile coverage and approach paths for aircraft. In France the law is in force, but the decree that would let operators use it has not been published, so in practice nothing has yet changed at the fence line [4][5].

What the texts say

Reuters reported on 21 October, from interviews with more than 30 executives, officials and specialists, that counter-drone technology is maturing faster than the rules governing its use. A French test programme at Brétigny-sur-Orge has catalogued 17 counter-drone systems and three integrators, ranging from electronic jammers to interceptor drones [1]. Reuters describes the French law passed in August as letting approved operators detect, jam and shoot down drones near designated facilities [1].

The statute is narrower than that summary. Article 25 of Loi n° 2026-791 of 16 August 2026 adds a paragraph II to article L213-2 of the Code de la sécurité intérieure. It allows designated operators of vital importance, and their approved contractors, to use the neutralisation devices already listed for state services, in the event of an imminent threat to vital points under their responsibility or to prevent overflight of a restricted zone [2]. The operators are designated by a Prime Minister’s order of which only the title is published [2]. Each use needs a reasoned administrative authorisation that names contractors, specifies the permitted devices and defines the area of use so as to limit risk to people and property [5]. Agents need a professional security card plus training and certification to be set by a Conseil d’État decree [5].

That decree had not appeared when legal commentator Ibrahim Bessat wrote on 21 September. He notes that the regime excludes permanent preventive surveillance, and that until the decree is published the operating instruction remains to detect, alert and not intervene technically against the aircraft [4]. The two accounts therefore differ. Reuters presents a live power to jam and shoot down. The statute and commentary describe a power that exists in law but cannot yet be exercised [1][4]. The Assemblée nationale vote in May was reported as covering about 1,500 sites run by roughly 300 operators [7].

The Conseil d’État had flagged the radio dimension before the vote. Its March opinion says anti-drone measures can interfere with flight, damage property, endanger people and disrupt radio frequencies. It accepted the extension as strictly necessary only if the judicial police officer is informed without delay of each use, and if good-faith owners can seek compensation [3].

The spectrum control already in place

France already has a mechanism for state jamming, and it is the template operators will meet. Under article R213-5, authorisation of a jamming device is granted on the basis of an impact study, coordinated by the national spectrum agency ANFR, covering frequencies used by state administrations and those assigned by ARCOM and ARCEP. The application must set out the main effects on assignees and the proposed mitigations, and the study is valid for no more than three years [6]. For an unplanned operation the study can be limited to assignees identified within the geographic perimeter [6].

Volume matters here. A DSNA presentation to a DSAC aviation safety symposium states that the air navigation service received about 130 state jamming projects in the preceding 12 months. For each one, DSNA defines the affected airspace and mitigation measures [8]. The same slides show reported GNSS events rising from 18 in 2020 to 90 in 2025, and state that France has no national framework for spoofing [8]. Adding hundreds of private sites to a process sized for state users is a workload question that none of the texts reviewed addresses.

Elsewhere in Europe and in APAC

Austria’s interior minister announced in September an amendment to the Telecommunications Act so that critical infrastructure operators such as large energy companies can intercept threatening drones. A final working-group report is due by the end of 2026 [9]. Choosing telecommunications law as the vehicle is telling. In both France and Australia, the controls on jamming sit in radio law, not aviation law [6][17].

Czech ministries proposed in July that critical infrastructure operators set protective zones and authorise trained staff to neutralise drones [13]. Methods discussed include jamming, takeover, interceptor drones and nets, and the equipment list has not been published [14]. Poland’s draft amendment to the Railway Transport Act, published in October, would let the Railway Security Guard disable or destroy drones [11]. An August report describes powers to destroy, immobilise or take control of them [12]. Germany’s amendment to its aviation security law instead keeps mitigation with the state, letting the Bundeswehr jam or shoot down drones over critical infrastructure [10]. Reuters reports that the interior ministry is now reviewing how operators could be legally involved [1]. The European Commission’s February action plan centres on preparedness, detection and coordinated response. Its public summary does not address mitigation authority or spectrum [18].

Australia is asking the same question. The Home Affairs consultation paper of April 2026 asks whether detection equipment should extend to critical infrastructure operators. It says reforms must ensure only properly authorised and trained operators deploy RF counter-drone technologies, and it warns that active RF tools can affect Wi-Fi, mobile networks, GNSS, aviation navigation aids and aircraft systems [15]. Today the ACMA restricts counter-drone equipment to section 27 exemptions, including a 2022 determination for police [17]. The mobile industry body AMTA asked that jamming be kept to the smallest area and shortest duration possible. It also asked that any new users beyond current section 27 holders be told of their duty to notify spectrum licensees, because jamming disrupts legitimate users, including emergency calls [16]. No source reviewed mentions Malaysia.

What operators should do now

  • Map every RF dependency within a plausible mitigation footprint before buying an effector: GNSS timing for protection relays and substations, private LTE, licence-exempt 2.4 and 5.8 GHz links, telemetry and SCADA radios, and nearby aviation aids. The French impact-study model assumes the applicant can state these effects [6].
  • Treat detection and alerting as the deliverable for now. In France, the operating instruction until the decree appears is to detect and alert, not to intervene [4].
  • Build notification into procedures. French law requires immediate notice to the judicial police officer, and Australian carriers are asking for notice to spectrum licensees [3][16].
  • Prefer effectors whose footprint can be bounded and documented. Authorisations are being written around a defined area of use, and regulators and carriers are asking for minimum area and duration [5][16].
  • Record each event: emission time, duration, band and observed side effects. That record is the evidence base for renewals and liability disputes. Reuters reports that operators on NATO’s eastern flank want legal assurance on collateral damage before they act [1].

The spectrum question

Moving mitigation authority to infrastructure operators turns several hundred civilian organisations into licensed or exempted emitters in the bands their own operations depend on. The legal texts reviewed say who may press the button. Only the French impact-study regime and the Australian carrier submission say how anyone will know what the button did to the spectrum around it [6][16]. Until national decrees and exemption instruments set out coordination, notification and logging, a jammer at the fence line is as likely to blind the site’s own links as to stop the drone.

Sources

Every R3KONX article cites its primary material. 18 sources, in order of first citation. Links open the original publication.

  1. Europe weighs giving utilities, infrastructure companies more powers to bring down drones Reuters via Defense News · 2026-10-21
  2. Loi n° 2026-791 du 16 août 2026 actualisant la programmation militaire pour les années 2024 à 2030 et portant diverses dispositions intéressant la défense (JORF text) Journal officiel de la République française (copy hosted by FHF) · 2026-08-18
  3. Avis sur un projet de loi actualisant la programmation militaire pour les années 2024 à 2030 et portant diverses dispositions intéressant la défense Conseil d'État · 2026-03-26
  4. La neutralisation des drones ouverte aux agents privés de sécurité : une évolution encadrée, pas une libéralisation Village de la Justice · 2026-09-21
  5. Article L213-2 du code de la sécurité intérieure : neutralisation des drones (texte consolidé et décryptage) 83-629.fr · 2026-08-19
  6. Article R213-5 du code de la sécurité intérieure : brouillage radioélectrique, étude d'impact ANFR 83-629.fr · 2024-03-15
  7. Loi de programmation militaire : l'Assemblée vote l'autorisation pour certains sites sensibles de gérer leur protection anti-drones Boursorama · 2026-05-18
  8. Gestion du risque d'interférence (DSNA presentation, DSAC symposium PBN: efficacité des trajectoires et défis de sécurité) Ministère de la Transition écologique / DGAC · 2026-03-18
  9. Interim report on drone defense presented Militär Aktuell · 2026-09-25
  10. Neues Anti-Drohnen-Gesetz im Bundestag: Experten uneinig ZDFheute · 2026-02-26
  11. Poland plans to let railway guards neutralize drones amid sabotage fears Anadolu Agency via A News · 2026-10-17
  12. Nowe uprawnienia Straży Ochrony Kolei. Projekt mówi m.in. o broni palnej money.pl · 2026-08-21
  13. Czescy cywile będą niszczyć drony nad infrastrukturą krytyczną? XYZ.pl · 2026-07-21
  14. Nowe prawo: drony nad infrastrukturą krytyczną Spider's Web · 2026-08-08
  15. Drones Security: public consultation paper Australian Government Department of Home Affairs · 2026-04-01
  16. Submission to Consultation on Drone Security Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association · 2026-05-22
  17. Exemptions for banned equipment Australian Communications and Media Authority · 2026-10-24
  18. New plan to counter drone threats European Commission · 2026-02-11

Researched and written by the R3KONX analysis desk from the cited primary material. French statutory text was read through a published copy of the Journal officiel and a consolidated-code site, because Légifrance could not be retrieved, and some national positions are drawn from press reporting of drafts that may change. No Malaysian source was found. Corrections to event@r3konx.asia.

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