IATA’s GNSS interference figures measure reporting, not exposure
IATA told its safety conference that reported GPS spoofing rose 193% and reported jamming 67% between 2023 and 2025. Its own flight-data series measures something else. Both are rising; only one can be used to plan.

Two numbers that count different things
At the IATA World Safety and Operations Conference in Istanbul on 6 October, IATA’s Director of Safety Mark Searle said reported GNSS jamming rose 67% and reported GPS spoofing rose 193% when 2025 is compared with 2023 [1]. The accompanying release records a rise in GNSS interference and publishes no counts with it [2]. These are growth figures for report volumes. They are not a measure of how much airspace is affected, and they are not interchangeable with the rate series IATA publishes elsewhere.
IATA’s own GNSS radio frequency interference safety risk assessment, version 5 of July 2025, draws on the Flight Data eXchange programme. It records more than one million GPS signal loss instances across about 24.6 million flights between August 2021 and June 2025, and states that GPS loss events per 1,000 flights rose in the first half of 2025 against 2024 [3]. In a sample of about 370,000 flights, receiver recovery took more than 30 minutes in a significant number of cases [3].
The FAA’s GNSS Interference Resource Guide, version 1.1 of 12 March 2026, cites a September 2024 IATA report putting the rise in GNSS loss per 1,000 flights at 65% for the first half of 2024 against 2023 [4]. That is a rate derived from flight data. The 193% and 67% figures are changes in voluntary report volumes over a different period. Both series point the same way. They do not measure the same quantity, and quoting one as though it were the other overstates what is known.
Why the reporting denominator is weak
Report counts depend on who reports and how consistently. Searle’s own speech supplies the evidence: 52% of accident reports were completed in line with Annex 13 obligations between 2020 and 2024 [1]. Where states are uneven on accident reporting, uniform interference reporting is unlikely.
The channels are fragmented. The Irish Aviation Authority’s advisory memorandum ASAM 050, issue 2 of 3 September 2026, reminds operators of their obligation to report safety-affecting events under Regulation (EU) No 376/2014, directs interference reports to ANSPs and to EUROCONTROL’s EVAIR, and points to AUGUR for current and historical status [8]. The FAA asks for real-time notification to ATC and a written submission through its GPS anomaly reporting site, listing aircraft type and registration, time and position, phase of flight, receiver make and model, maintenance actions and operational consequences [4]. Notification to ATC is required in FAA-controlled oceanic airspace regardless of where the interference occurred [4].
- Report counts rise when reporting is encouraged, which is a measurement artefact as much as a threat signal.
- Rate series per 1,000 flights are comparable between periods; report counts are not comparable between jurisdictions.
- FIR-level counts published by the FAA for July and August 2024 put Nicosia at 5,655 incidents, Tel Aviv at 3,228 and Cairo at 2,375 [4].
What the measured picture adds
Measurement networks produce a different class of evidence. Writing in GPS Solutions, Benon Gattis, Jaroslaw Cydejko and Dennis Akos describe a four-node time difference of arrival network along the Polish coast, built from software-defined radios and timing-capable receivers, that localised two emitters in data from April to June 2025 [10]. They placed a circular spoofer on the Kaliningrad coast and a jammer at the military harbour at Baltijsk, with one spoofer solution about 50 m from suspected antenna positions and solutions returned in under five minutes [10]. The authors assess the emitters as static and probably ground-based, note that the Baltijsk source could sit on a ship or on a harbour tower, and attribute long-range propagation to sea ducting [10].
A separate shipborne campaign by GPSPatron and Gdynia Maritime University, run aboard a research vessel near the Polish coast, found GNSS positioning unavailable off Gdansk about 17% of the time at the late-June and July peak, with strong spoofing appearing offshore rather than in port. The researchers describe a distributed multi-node transmitter network whose methods switch on and off together, and attribute the source to land-based transmitters [11]. Reporting on the earlier shore-based phase of the same collaboration recorded 84 hours of GPS interference over six months from June 2024, including 29 hours in October alone, with some disruptions lasting up to seven hours, and offered the hedged conclusion that the most plausible explanation for the jamming was a source aboard a vessel in international waters [12].
The two readings disagree on platform. The peer-reviewed geolocation work places static emitters ashore in Kaliningrad; the earlier interpretation of the shore sensor data favoured a vessel. That disagreement is the point. Geolocation evidence can be argued over, because it carries a position. Report counts cannot be argued over at all, because they do not.
What operators should do with the figures
Use the rate series for trend work and treat the reported-incident series as an indicator of reporting health. For risk assessment, IATA’s own document is more useful than the headline percentages. It identifies spoofing as harder to detect than jamming and as the greater safety risk, and lists the systems at stake: RNP and RNAV capability, ADS-B out, the TAWS look-ahead function, CPDLC, SATCOM, runway overrun protection and the aircraft clock [3][4]. The FAA guide notes that spoofed data can persist after an aircraft leaves the affected area, so receivers may require a ground or factory reset [4].
- Confirm conventional approaches and navaids remain available on planned routes, and train for sustained GNSS loss rather than assuming degradation is brief [3].
- ANSPs should implement minimum safe altitude warning independent of GNSS and monitor ADS-B quality indicators [3].
- Adopt the pilot-ATC phraseology, electronic flight bag provisions and training requirements in EASA Safety Information Bulletin 2022-02 revision 4, published on 3 July 2026, the fourth revision of a bulletin first issued in March 2022 [5][6].
- Track the EASA and EUROCONTROL European Aviation Action Plan, which sets out 16 short-term actions mainly across 2026 to 2028 and five mid- and long-term actions after 2030, and whose actions timeline appendix is still blank in edition 1.0 [7].
The Asia-Pacific exposure is specific. IATA’s risk assessment names Delhi, Mumbai, Yangon and Kunming among Asian hotspots, alongside the Black Sea, eastern Mediterranean, Middle East, Baltic and Arctic [3]. The FAA guide’s revision, shaped by comments from an industry action team, lists the areas most affected by spoofing as including the India and Pakistan border, Iraq and Iran, the Korean peninsula and areas around Beijing [9]. Operators in the region do not need European report volumes to justify procedural work. They need their own rate data, and most do not have it.
The electronic intelligence reading
A 193% rise in reports and a measured rate per 1,000 flights are both real, and only one of them supports planning. Reporting systems tell you how well an industry notices. Monitoring networks tell you where an emitter is. The Baltic work shows that four receivers and open processing can return a position in minutes, which is the capability that turns interference from a statistic into something an enforcement authority can act on. Aviation has spent four years improving how it reports GNSS interference. Measuring it is the next step, and it is the one that produces evidence.
Sources
Every R3KONX article cites its primary material. 12 sources, in order of first citation. Links open the original publication.
- WSOC 2026 Speech - Mark Searle, IATA Director of Safety International Air Transport Association · 2026-10-06
- People, Technology, and Standards Together will Drive Safety Improvements International Air Transport Association · 2026-10-06
- IATA Safety Risk Assessment - GNSS Interference, Version 5 International Air Transport Association · 2025-07
- GNSS Interference Resource Guide: Jamming and/or Spoofing, Version 1.1 US Federal Aviation Administration, Flight Technologies and Procedures Division · 2026-03-12
- EASA updates Safety Information Bulletin on GNSS interference European Union Aviation Safety Agency · 2026-07-03
- Global navigation satellite system outages and alterations European Union Aviation Safety Agency · 2026-07-03
- European Aviation Action Plan for Ensuring Safe Operations during GNSS Interferences, Edition 1.0 EASA and EUROCONTROL · 2026-02-06
- Aeronautical Services Advisory Memorandum ASAM No. 050, Issue 2: Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Interference Irish Aviation Authority · 2026-09-03
- FAA Publishes Updated GPS/GNSS Interferences, Jamming and Spoofing Resource National Business Aviation Association · 2026-03-23
- Baltic sea GNSS jamming and spoofing emitter detection and localization in real-time using a time difference of arrival (TDOA) system GPS Solutions, vol. 30, article 96 · 2026-03-14
- Study: Baltic GPS Disruption Comes From a Tactically-Controlled Network The Maritime Executive · 2025-12-22
- Polish study suggests ships are conducting GPS jamming operations in the Baltic Splash247 · 2025-03-04
Researched and written by the R3KONX analysis desk from the cited primary material. The reported-incident percentages and the flight-data rate series cover different periods and different populations and are not directly comparable; each is given as its source states it. Corrections to event@r3konx.asia.
