ELINT · Electronic Intelligence

MGN 719 makes GNSS denial a planning assumption but leaves detection and reporting to the reader

The UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency now tells ships, ports and VTS operators to plan for satellite navigation being unavailable. Its new guidance asks for interference detection procedures without saying what to detect or where to report it.

The UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) has moved GNSS denial from an incident to a planning assumption. Marine Guidance Note 719, published on 1 October, tells shipowners, masters, harbour authorities, port operators and vessel traffic service (VTS) providers that satellite positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) is not universally available in some locations, and that they must be ready to operate when it is degraded, unreliable or absent [1]. It is clear about dependencies, thin on detection, and says nothing about where an interference event should be reported.

What MGN 719 says

The note names the Black Sea, the Baltic, the Gulf region and parts of East Asia as areas of rising interference. It defines jamming as signals being blocked or degraded, and spoofing as false position information being presented to users [1]. Its dependency list is broader than most shipping guidance. On board it covers ECDIS, integrated bridge systems, AIS, GNSS-fed radar, track control, dynamic positioning, gyro compasses, GMDSS and pilot portable units. Ashore it covers VTS, port management systems, pilotage management, search and rescue coordination and LRIT [1].

It also lists timing as its own category: communications networks, data and monitoring networks that use NTP or PTP, control systems that depend on UTC traceability, and platform management systems [1]. That is the part most likely to be missed in a port or terminal. A spoofed or jammed receiver that feeds a time server can degrade systems that never display a position.

The recommended actions are procedural. Stakeholders should review risk assessments, map critical systems and their data flows, establish procedures for detecting and responding to interference, verify navigational information by independent means, exercise contingency procedures in drills, and engage service providers on resilience [1]. Mariners are told to keep radar fixing, visual techniques, celestial navigation and dead reckoning in practice [1]. Yachting Monthly notes that leisure sailors are named among the audiences, although the note carries no advice specific to small craft [3].

What it leaves open

Paragraph 3.2.3 asks for detection procedures. The note does not describe indicators of jamming or spoofing, and it does not say to whom an event should be reported or in what format. The only contact given is the MCA’s Marine Safety and PNT Services address, which is a general enquiry point rather than a stated reporting route [1].

Other authorities have been more specific. A 2023 US Maritime Administration advisory, now cancelled, told mariners to report GPS disruption to the US Coast Guard Navigation Center (NAVCEN) immediately, with latitude, longitude, date, time and duration, and noted that NAVCEN forwards reports to the NATO Shipping Centre [9]. NAVCEN publishes those reports through its GUIDE tool, while warning that they do not validate or verify any degradation and that its heat map is representative only [10]. In March 2024 the ITU, ICAO and IMO Secretaries-General jointly asked states to report harmful interference to telecommunication, aeronautical and maritime authorities and to the ITU Radiocommunication Bureau [8]. IMO’s MSC.1/Circ.1644 asks member states to consider warning mariners about affected areas and times [12].

Without a defined route, UK-flagged ships and UK ports will produce detection logs that may never become regulatory evidence. That weakens the one lever states have under the ITU Radio Regulations, which require special measures to keep radionavigation free of harmful interference [8].

What the data says

Monitoring data supports the MCA’s premise, but the numbers need care. SAFETY4SEA, reporting Windward’s Q3 2026 review, gives an average of 5,131 jamming incidents per day, broadly unchanged from Q2. Distinct vessels affected rose 11.7 per cent to 124,235. The quarter’s highest day was 1 September, with 6,838 incidents globally and 1,699 in the Middle East Gulf, while interference in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb fell 64 per cent between July and September [6]. Windward’s Q1 2026 figure was framed differently, as about 978,000 events, 98 per cent of them in the Gulf [7]. The units differ between releases, so the quarters should be read as trends rather than added together.

Windward also documents the downstream effect. A receiver under interference passes false coordinates to AIS, which then broadcasts them faithfully. Vessels have appeared at ports they never visited, on land and at airports, and one tanker off Qatar was displaced to six areas within 24 hours [7].

Survey evidence points the same way. The Royal Institute of Navigation drew on more than 100 sector experts and 300 captains. It linked at least two 2025 collisions or groundings to GNSS interference, and it found that radar, VHF/MF/HF radios, NAVTEX, speed logs and ship clocks depend on GNSS without needing it for their primary function [5]. Splash247 attributes to the same research a finding that 14 per cent of respondents had experienced an unsafe or unlawful situation [2]. That figure does not appear on RIN’s own summary page and is unverified here.

East Asia is not a footnote. Analysis from the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy counts South Korean GPS jamming incidents rising from 39 in 2023 to 578 in 2024. A campaign between 29 May and 2 June 2025 affected more than 500 aircraft and hundreds of ships [11].

What it costs, and when backup arrives

MGN 719 cites the government’s 2023 economic impact study. London Economics estimated that a seven-day outage would cost UK maritime £1.5bn, of which £1,309m falls on port operations, £183m on shipping and £8m on fishing [1][4]. The port figure is driven by automated cranes that shut down with no alternative [4]. The study’s evidence reflects conditions in March 2021, and its executive summary gives two slightly different totals for the wider economy, £7,644m and £7,625.3m [4]. Its authors warn that results may date quickly [4].

The backup is not imminent. The MCA says the UK PNT Office is developing a sovereign eLoran network, with timing planned for 2028 and position and navigation for 2030 [1]. The Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation reports, without official confirmation, that the Ministry of Defence has separately contracted a deployable eLoran-based system for delivery within two years [13]. The MCA itself says complementary technologies such as VDES R-Mode are unlikely to be available at scale in the near term [1].

What to do

  • Map timing dependencies as well as position. Identify every NTP or PTP server, crane controller and terminal system that takes time from a GNSS receiver, and confirm its holdover behaviour [1][4].
  • Write down what detection means on your bridge or in your VTS: GNSS position disagreeing with radar fixes, gyro and log, sudden jumps, receiver alarms, and AIS targets in impossible places [1][7].
  • Log every event with position, date, time, duration and affected equipment, the fields NAVCEN’s process uses, so records can support a report [9].
  • Until the MCA names a reporting route, send events to the flag state and to the MCA PNT contact, and ask the administration to forward them to the ITU Radiocommunication Bureau [1][8].
  • Drill crews in radar, visual and dead-reckoning navigation, and run ECDIS without a GNSS input in exercises [1][2].
  • For ports and terminals in Malaysia and the wider region with automated handling, test the London Economics finding locally: what stops when timing is lost [4].

The ELINT reading

MGN 719 treats the RF environment as hostile by default, which is the correct planning posture. The guidance stops at the receiver. Interference is an emitter problem, and emitters are found by collecting, correlating and reporting observations from many platforms. Each ship and port running a detection procedure is a sensor. Without a reporting standard, those sensors produce local logs rather than a shared picture that regulators, spectrum authorities and the ITU could use. The next revision of the note should define the indicators, the fields and the route.

Sources

Every R3KONX article cites its primary material. 13 sources, in order of first citation. Links open the original publication.

  1. MGN 719 (M+F) Operating in GNSS denied and degraded environments Maritime and Coastguard Agency (GOV.UK) · 2026-10-01
  2. Britain urges ships to prepare for life without reliable GPS Splash247 · 2026-10-13
  3. MCA tells maritime sector to plan for life without GPS Yachting Monthly · 2026-10-12
  4. The economic impact on the UK of a disruption to GNSS: executive summary (London Economics) UK Space Agency and Department for Science, Innovation and Technology · 2023-10-18
  5. Industry maritime report highlights growing need for GNSS resilience Royal Institute of Navigation · 2026-01-26
  6. Attacks, piracy and dark-fleet risks surge in Q3 2026 SAFETY4SEA · 2026-10-08
  7. GPS Jamming Is Breaking the AIS Data Compliance Teams Rely On Windward · 2026-06-25
  8. Joint statement on the protection of the Radio Navigation Satellite Service from harmful interference ITU, ICAO and IMO · 2024-03-17
  9. U.S. Maritime Advisory 2023-013: Various – GPS Interference and AIS Spoofing US Maritime Administration · 2023-10-02
  10. GPS User Issue Detection and Evaluation (GUIDE) Tool US Coast Guard Navigation Center · 2026-10-15
  11. Countering North Korean GPS jamming: alliance responses and European lessons Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS), Brussels School of Governance · 2025-07-11
  12. States must tackle GNSS interference to prevent ship accidents Riviera Maritime Media · 2025
  13. UK MOD moving on eLoran Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation · 2026-04-27

Researched and written by the R3KONX analysis desk from the cited primary material. Windward's quarterly figures are taken from SAFETY4SEA's report of them, and the Royal Institute of Navigation's full survey report could not be retrieved, so its 14 per cent figure is cited only as reported by Splash247. Interference counts from different monitors use different units and are not directly comparable. Corrections to event@r3konx.asia.

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