ELINT · Electronic Intelligence

NATO’s GNSS jammer tender makes deconfliction a deliverable

Allied Command Transformation is buying six portable jammer kits for GNSS-denial training, with cut-off, logging and footprint data written into the specification. A fatal US air ambulance accident under active military jamming shows why the procedure around the emitter matters as much as the kit.

NATO is buying jammers to train its forces for GNSS denial, and the tender treats safety controls as deliverables. Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk, Virginia, published a pre-solicitation notice on 15 October 2026 for six portable GNSS jammer kits, with the solicitation due on 26 October [1][2]. The specification asks for automatic cut-off, emission logs timed independently of GNSS, verified output power and footprint tables for airspace deconfliction [2]. Those requirements matter because the most detailed recent record of controlled jamming meeting civil traffic is a fatal accident report. In May 2026 US military GPS jamming was active when an air ambulance flew into a New Mexico ridge [5].

What the notice asks for

The notice, reference RFP-ACT-SACT-26-101, is a sealed-bid, fixed-price procurement under NATO common funding, with an estimated value of EUR 1.1 million [2]. ACT estimates bids will close on 30 November and the contract will be awarded on 11 December 2026 [1][2]. Only firms from NATO member nations with a national declaration of eligibility may bid [2]. The Defence Blog reported that the US Commerce Department set 23 October as the deadline for US firms to request that declaration [3]. ACT’s own notice gives 26 October for declarations to reach it [2]. The two dates refer to different steps.

The stated purpose is training and exercises, so that crews learn to detect, report and adapt to GNSS and drone-link interference [2]. The notice also says the kits would be used in operations or training with bounded effects [2]. Trade coverage has read the purchase as both a training buy and a possible operational capability [3][4].

  • Bands: GPS, GLONASS, Galileo and BeiDou signals including L1, L2, L5, E1, E5a, E6, B1I, B2a and B3I, with each band selectable [2].
  • Drone links: video at 5 to 6 GHz and control at 400 to 500 MHz and 2 to 3 GHz, plus 1.2 to 1.3 GHz, 3 to 5 GHz and several cellular bands [2]. One cellular range is printed as 700 to 9280 MHz, which appears to be a typographical error.
  • Denial radius: adjustable from 500 m to 11 km in steps of 500 m or less, measured against reference receivers at 2 m and 120 m above ground [2].
  • Deconfliction: predicted footprint tables up to 10,000 ft, a time-limited mode with automatic cut-off, and time-stamped, exportable emission logs [2].
  • Control: laptop operation by non-specialists, authenticated and encrypted satellite remote control, local override and remote shutdown [2].
  • Deliverables: a demonstration plan, on-site training at a NATO unit in Europe or the UK, a user guide with a safety and deconfliction annex, and a per-kit emission test report formatted to support national and NATO spectrum authorisation [2][3].

Why the safety annex matters: the Ruidoso record

The NTSB preliminary report on WPR26FA186 sets out what happens when planned jamming and civil flying overlap [5]. A Beech C90 on a Part 135 air ambulance flight left Roswell at 2352 local on 13 May 2026 [5]. The crew reported loss of GPS capability at 0000:26 [5]. At 0001:17 the controller asked his supervisor to have the military stop jamming. The supervisor called again at about 0005 [5]. ADS-B updates recovered at 0007:34. At about 0010, after the crew accepted a visual approach, the supervisor told the military that jamming could resume [5]. The aircraft struck terrain near the Capitan Mountains at about 0015. All four occupants died [5].

The NTSB has not stated a cause [5]. IEEE Spectrum reports that this is the first investigation in which the NTSB has named jamming as a potential factor [8].

The footprint was large. The FAA Safety Team advisory for test WSMRNM GPS 26-13 gave nested radii of 210 nm at 50 ft above ground, 240 nm at 4,000 ft above ground and at 10,000 ft, and 366 nm at FL400 and above [6]. The NTSB summarises the NOTAM as a 366 nm radius at various altitudes [5]. AOPA describes 240 nm from 4,000 to 10,000 ft above ground and notes that the destination lay within 70 nm of the centre [7]. The sources differ in how they express the altitude bands, not in the outer radius.

The stop-request process has a history. IEEE Spectrum cites anonymous controller reports to NASA’s safety reporting system from 2021 and 2024 describing refused or delayed stop requests at White Sands [8]. It also reports an unverified claim that each stop costs the military $5 million to $10 million; neither the FAA nor White Sands would comment [8]. AOPA counts crew-reported GPS interference in that database rising from about six a year to 50 in 2024 and 40 in 2025, mostly outside the US [7].

What it means

The NATO kit is a different class of emitter. Its maximum radius is 11 km, against hundreds of nautical miles at White Sands [2][6]. Smaller, adjustable footprints are easier to deconflict. The governance problem is the same, however. EUROCONTROL’s guidelines for civil and military GNSS interference testing require an impact assessment by altitude, notification of air navigation service providers at least four weeks ahead, NOTAMs with standard wording, and a pre-agreed interruption procedure with a person in charge who is reachable throughout [10]. The guidelines contain no dedicated provision for emergency or safety-of-life flights [10]. EASA’s bulletin points to the same guidelines and asks national authorities to encourage civil-military coordination before GNSS disturbance systems are tested or used [11].

The ACT specification supplies the technical half of that process. Footprint tables feed the impact assessment. Remote shutdown and automatic cut-off make interruption fast. Logs timed independently of GNSS make it possible to reconstruct what was radiating when an aircraft reported loss [2][10]. Whether stop requests are honoured remains a procedural matter that no kit can settle.

The background demand is real. EASA revised its GNSS interference bulletin, SIB 2022-02R4, in July 2026, adding interim pilot-controller phraseology and new operational and training expectations [11][12]. It still judges that the issue is not an unsafe condition warranting a directive [11]. Poland’s National Institute of Telecommunications reported all-band disruption at its Gdańsk station on about 70 per cent of days in May and June 2026 [15]. In Asia, the FAA recorded six pilot reports of GPS interference near the Kuril Islands in the Fukuoka FIR between 22 July and 3 August 2026, four consistent with jamming and two with spoofing [14]. It called the area an emergent one, identified no source and noted that no NOTAM had been issued [14].

What to do

  • Exercise planners: run a documented impact assessment per flight level and agree interruption criteria and a named, reachable contact with the ANSP before any emission [10].
  • Procurement teams: write automatic cut-off, verifiable power control, GNSS-independent logging and emission test reports into jammer specifications, as ACT has [2].
  • ANSPs: brief every controller in the affected sectors on the interruption procedure and plan for extra workload during tests [10][5].
  • Operators: make GPS interference NOTAM checks part of every preflight, plan conventional alternatives, and request a stop through ATC when safety is affected [9][13].
  • Everyone: report anomalies through ATC and national reporting channels. Reports are how unplanned sources, such as the Kuril activity, become visible [13][14].

The electronic intelligence view

Training for a denied spectrum means radiating into a shared one. The ACT notice shows a military customer specifying the controls that make that defensible: bounded radius, logged emissions, independent time and a kill switch [2]. The Ruidoso report shows the cost when the procedure around the emitter is weaker than the emitter’s reach [5][8]. For APAC planners, the pattern is relevant now. Unplanned interference is already appearing on North Pacific routes without notification [14]. Any regional exercise that adds deliberate GNSS denial should arrive with an impact assessment, an interruption procedure and a log that can be audited afterwards [10].

Sources

Every R3KONX article cites its primary material. 15 sources, in order of first citation. Links open the original publication.

  1. NOPO ACT SACT 26-101: Notification of Procurement Opportunity for Portable GNSS Jammer Kits NATO Allied Command Transformation · 2026-10-16
  2. RFP-ACT-SACT-26-101 Portable GNSS jammer kits, pre-solicitation notice, Amendment 1 NATO Allied Command Transformation · 2026-10-15
  3. NATO plans to buy jammers that black out GPS for 11 km The Defence Blog · 2026-10-19
  4. NATO jammers will block out GPS for miles around TechRadar · 2026-10-23
  5. Aviation Investigation Preliminary Report WPR26FA186 US National Transportation Safety Board · 2026-06-18
  6. Flight Advisory: GPS Interference Testing, WSMRNM GPS 26-13 FAA Safety Team · 2026-05-12
  7. GPS jamming active when King Air struck mountain AOPA · 2026-06-18
  8. Safety Officials Probe Army GPS Jamming in Fatal Air Crash IEEE Spectrum · 2026-07-22
  9. Interagency Aviation Accident Prevention Bulletin IA APB 26-07: GPS Interference Testing US Department of the Interior and USDA Forest Service · 2026-07-17
  10. EUROCONTROL Guidelines on a Process for Civil and Military GNSS Interference Testing, Edition 2.0 (EUROCONTROL-GUID-190) EUROCONTROL · 2023-03-06
  11. Safety Information Bulletin 2022-02R4: GNSS outage and alterations leading to communication, navigation and surveillance degradation European Union Aviation Safety Agency · 2026-07-22
  12. EASA updates Safety Information Bulletin on GNSS interference European Union Aviation Safety Agency · 2026-07-03
  13. GNSS Interference Resource Guide, Version 1.1 Federal Aviation Administration, Flight Technologies and Procedures Division · 2026-03-12
  14. Fukuoka FIR GPS Interference Report Federal Aviation Administration, Security and Hazardous Materials Safety (via OPSGROUP) · 2026-08-10
  15. Polish institute analysis finds drastic increase in GNSS interference, offers guidelines GPS World · 2026-08-26

Researched and written by the R3KONX analysis desk from the cited primary material. The full ACT solicitation due on 26 October was not available, so the specification relies on the pre-solicitation notice; the original NOTAM was not retrieved, so the article relies on the FAA Safety Team advisory and the NTSB preliminary report, neither of which carries a publication date. Corrections to event@r3konx.asia.

R3KONX 2027

Work in this domain? So does the programme

4–6 May 2027, World Trade Centre Kuala Lumpur. Curated talks, hands-on training and The BattleGrid.