Tokyo’s first SMS blaster prosecution shows 2G switch-off does not remove the 2G attack
Japan has referred a vehicle-borne false base station operator to prosecutors under the Radio Act. The case, with a year of fresh enforcement in Malaysia, Canada and the UK, shows where the defence actually sits: in handsets, operator signalling analytics and spectrum enforcement.
What happened in Ginza
Japan has its first prosecution referral for a vehicle-borne SMS blaster. The Kanto Bureau of Telecommunications, part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), says it ran a joint operation with the Metropolitan Police Department in Chuo City on 7 November 2026. It referred one person to prosecutors on 9 November [1]. The alleged offences are operating an unlicensed radio station under Article 4 of the Radio Act and obstructing radio communications under Article 108-2 [1]. The bureau says the equipment impersonated a genuine mobile base station to send phishing SMS to nearby phones [1].
Press reports add detail from the police. The suspect is a 31-year-old Chinese national living in Tokyo. He was detained in a parked car in Ginza at about 3:30 p.m. and denies the allegations [3]. The messages were in Chinese. They claimed the recipient’s card had been suspended and linked to a card-harvesting site [2][3]. Since January 2025, 18 people, mostly visitors from China, have reported losses totalling about 4 million yen [3][4]. Police are still investigating whether the suspect caused those losses [2].
The reported scale differs. One wire report says more than 10,000 smartphones lost service for about an hour [3]. Commsrisk reports more than 10,000 phones disrupted in under two hours, including officers’ phones, within a radius of about 500 metres [2]. A Japanese compilation of national press coverage notes that outlets gave durations between one and two hours [4].
Two years from first complaint to arrest
Ginza was not a sudden discovery. NTT Docomo received complaints of lost service in Ginza, Shinjuku and other districts in December 2024 [3]. In January 2025 Docomo and MIC traced the outages to interfering transmissions [3]. On 2 May 2025 MIC warned that suspected illegal radio stations were knocking phones off the network in Tokyo and other cities and that users were receiving phishing SMS [5]. Docomo published a matching notice on 15 May 2025 [6]. According to the press compilation, Docomo later identified a suspect, MIC issued a warning with police, and the MPD began a full investigation in early 2026 [4]. The arrest came almost two years after the first complaints.
Why a country without 2G is still exposed
Japanese operators do not run a 2G network. The attack still worked because handsets retain 2G capability and will fall back to it [4]. GSMA’s FS.67 paper explains how. A typical blaster pairs two false base stations. A 4G cell imitates up to four operators and attracts nearby phones. It then pushes them to a 2G cell, either by unsecured RRC redirection or by tampering with cell reselection information [7]. 2G has no mandatory mutual authentication or ciphering, so the blaster can skip both, collect IMSI and IMEI, and deliver an SMS with any sender ID [7]. It then rejects the phone’s location update. The phone returns to the real network and ignores that cell for 12 to 24 hours [7]. Capture typically takes 15 seconds to five minutes for 4G phones [7].
The radio-layer consequence matters to spectrum managers as well as fraud teams. Blasters transmit on the impersonated operator’s 4G frequencies. They may jam 3G and 4G cells to force reselection. They can also be absorbed into the operator’s neighbour lists through Automatic Neighbour Relation, so handovers keep failing after the vehicle has gone [7]. MIC’s Kanto Bureau warns that illegal stations can also disrupt fire and ambulance radio and broadcast reception [1]. Devices captured by a blaster are cut off from their own network, including emergency calling [11].
The regional pattern
In September 2025 the GSMA Asia Pacific anti-scam taskforce, whose members include CelcomDigi and Maxis, listed SMS blaster activity in ten countries, including Japan, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam [8]. It asked governments to criminalise the sale, possession and use of the devices and to disrupt supply chains across borders [8].
Malaysia already enforces. MCMC found two vehicles transmitting from a fake station in Genting Highlands on 19 January 2026, after monitoring and network analysis with an operator [10]. The cited offences carry up to RM1 million or ten years’ imprisonment under the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998, and up to RM300,000 or three years under the technical standards regulations [10]. In August a 65-year-old man was arrested in Johor Bahru in a vehicle with a GSM module and an antenna. MCMC believes the operation targeted peak-hour commuters travelling to and from Singapore [9]. MCMC says that was its sixth fake BTS operation of 2026 [9].
Outside Asia, Toronto police charged three men in April 2026. Investigators estimate about 13 million cases of devices being captured by the network [11]. In the UK, a Preston man was jailed for three years and eight months in August 2026 for running a blaster from a van. Police found 7,859 compromised card records on his phones [12].
What to do
The controls exist. Coverage is uneven.
- Operators: implement the FS.67 detection set. This includes bursts of handover preparation failures with unknown target IDs, global eNB IDs absent from inventory, one PCI reused across bands, 5 MHz LTE carriers where the network uses wider ones, and 2G emissions on or next to live 3G or 4G carriers [7].
- Operators: block insecure redirection to 2G for Release 15 and later devices, and to 2G and 3G for compliant Release 18 devices. Deploy honeypot handsets with SMS barred in busy retail and transit areas, so any SMS received must come from a blaster [7].
- Enterprises: set a policy to disable 2G on managed Android devices, which Android 14 and later support on compatible hardware. Do not treat SMS one-time codes as a strong second factor for privileged access [7].
- Users and security teams: Android has offered a 2G protection toggle since Android 12. Android 16 network notifications warn of unencrypted connections and identifier requests, but initially only on Pixel 10 devices. GIGAZINE reports no comparable iOS setting [13].
- Regulators: carry out radio measurement and direction-finding to prove spectrum misuse, and coordinate with customs on imports, as FS.67 recommends [7].
The electromagnetic view from Kuala Lumpur
For the ELINT community, an SMS blaster is a low-power emitter that moves with its operator and repeats the same signal characteristics. That makes it detectable, as the Tokyo, Genting and Johor cases show. The bottleneck is time. Tokyo took almost two years to go from first complaint to arrest [3]. Malaysia’s results suggest that national monitoring combined with operator analytics can work faster [10]. The remaining gap is the handset. Until fallback-to-2G is switched off by default, every visitor to Ginza, Genting or the Johor causeway remains within reach of a car-boot transmitter.
Sources
Every R3KONX article cites its primary material. 13 sources, in order of first citation. Links open the original publication.
- Fake base station (illegal radio station) enforcement leads to one person referred to prosecutors: joint operation with the Metropolitan Police Department Kanto Bureau of Telecommunications, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (Japan) · 2026-11-09
- Tokyo Police Arrest Chinese National Using SMS Blaster to Scam Tourists Commsrisk · 2026-11-09
- Chinese national arrested over fake mobile phone base station in Tokyo's Ginza The Star (Japan News/ANN) · 2026-11-10
- Summary of fraudulent SMS sent via fake base stations (偽基地局を使った詐欺SMSの送信についてまとめてみた) piyolog · 2026-11-10
- Interference with mobile phone services from radio equipment suspected to be illegal radio stations: beware of phishing SMS Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (Japan) · 2025-05-02
- Interference with mobile phone service suspected to be caused by illegal radio stations NTT Docomo · 2025-05-15
- FS.67 SMS Blasters Briefing Paper, version 2.0 GSMA · 2026-03-25
- GSMA Asia Pacific mobile industry taskforce calls for government and law enforcement support to stamp out SMS Blaster device threat GSMA · 2025-09-23
- MCMC, police bust 'Fake BTS' scam syndicate in Johor New Straits Times · 2026-08-11
- MCMC shuts down illegal transceiver station used to send scam messages in Genting The Star (Bernama) · 2026-01-31
- Canada arrests three for operating SMS blaster device in Toronto BleepingComputer · 2026-04-27
- Lancashire man sent to prison for operating rogue UK cell phone tower ISPreview · 2026-09-03
- How to spot fake cell towers in Android's 'Network Notifications' setting GIGAZINE · 2026-01-21
Researched and written by the R3KONX Analysis Desk from the cited primary material. Disruption figures in the Tokyo case come from police statements relayed by the press and differ between outlets; they are reported as they differ. The suspect denies the allegations and has not been convicted. Corrections: event@r3konx.asia.
